0.34.6_repo_cleanup

src/upstream.rs

@@ -1,6 +1,3 @@
-//! Per-backend connection pools and connect-time DNS validation.
-//! No HTTP caller can supply a destination. DNS answers are validated once and
-//! passed directly to HttpConnector; there is no second unvalidated lookup.
 use crate::config::{ip_policy, Backend};
 use anyhow::{ensure, Context, Result};
 use http::Uri;
@@ -152,8 +149,6 @@ impl AddressPolicy {
 #[derive(Clone, Debug)]
 pub struct GuardedResolver {
     policy: AddressPolicy,
-    /// When TLS uses a separate verified server name, resolve/connect only the
-    /// hostname from the configured backend URL, never the SNI hostname.
     connect_host: Option<String>,
 }
 impl Service<Name> for GuardedResolver {
@@ -178,8 +173,6 @@ impl Service<Name> for GuardedResolver {
                 io::Error::new(io::ErrorKind::WouldBlock, "DNS worker limit reached")
             })?;
             let lookup = tokio::task::spawn_blocking(move || {
-                // The permit lives inside the worker even if the caller times out.
-                // An OS resolver stuck in getaddrinfo cannot create an unbounded worker queue.
                 let _permit = permit;
                 policy.validate_answers((hostname.as_str(), 0).to_socket_addrs()?)
             });
@@ -197,8 +190,6 @@ pub struct TimedConnector {
     inner: InnerConnector,
     policy: AddressPolicy,
     timeout: Duration,
-    /// The configured backend/TLS identity, never the forwarded HTTP Host.
-    /// The resolver separately pins DNS to the configured backend URL.
     destination: Uri,
 }
 impl Service<Uri> for TimedConnector {
@@ -210,8 +201,6 @@ impl Service<Uri> for TimedConnector {
         self.inner.poll_ready(cx).map_err(Into::into)
     }
     fn call(&mut self, _request_uri: Uri) -> Self::Future {
-        // A preserved HTTP/2 :authority can be a public vhost name. Never
-        // resolve or dial it: all sockets must target the configured origin.
         let uri = self.destination.clone();
         if let Some(ip) = uri.host().and_then(|host| {
             host.trim_start_matches('[')
@@ -259,15 +248,6 @@ fn roots(backend: &Backend) -> Result<RootCertStore> {
     Ok(roots)
 }
 
-/// Explicit backend-only escape hatch. `tls_verify=false` means that the backend
-/// certificate is not authenticated at all: chain/name checks and certificate
-/// signature parsing are skipped. TLS transport encryption and the normal
-/// address/DNS/loop policy remain in force.
-///
-/// Do not delegate CertificateVerify to WebPkiServerVerifier here. webpki parses
-/// the presented X.509 certificate even after `verify_server_cert()` accepted it,
-/// which rejects legacy X.509 v1 appliance certificates with
-/// `UnsupportedCertVersion`. That made `tls_verify=false` only a partial bypass.
 #[derive(Debug)]
 struct BackendCertificateVerificationDisabled {
     supported_schemes: Vec<SignatureScheme>,
@@ -303,8 +283,6 @@ impl ServerCertVerifier for BackendCertificateVerificationDisabled {
         self.supported_schemes.clone()
     }
 }
-/// A bounded raw TCP liveness check, using the same configured-origin address
-/// policy as normal requests. Every DNS answer is checked before any connection.
 pub async fn tcp_probe(origin: &str, policy: &AddressPolicy) -> Result<()> {
     let url = url::Url::parse(origin)?;
     let host = url
@@ -340,13 +318,9 @@ pub async fn tcp_probe(origin: &str, policy: &AddressPolicy) -> Result<()> {
 #[cfg(test)]
 include!("upstream/tests.rs");
 
-/// Enumerate local interfaces for wildcard-listener loop protection. If unavailable,
-/// the fallback checks whether a candidate address is actually bindable on this host.
 #[cfg(unix)]
 fn local_addresses() -> Option<Vec<IpAddr>> {
     let mut first: *mut libc::ifaddrs = std::ptr::null_mut();
-    // SAFETY: getifaddrs owns the returned linked list until freeifaddrs; family
-    // is inspected before casting each non-null sockaddr to its matching type.
     unsafe {
         if libc::getifaddrs(&mut first) != 0 {
             return None;
@@ -381,9 +355,6 @@ fn local_addresses() -> Option<Vec<IpAddr>> {
     None
 }
 
-/// Fallback used when interface enumeration is unavailable. Binding an ephemeral
-/// UDP socket to an address succeeds only when the OS considers that address local
-/// (without non-local/freebind socket options, which Rust does not enable here).
 fn locally_bindable(ip: IpAddr) -> bool {
     std::net::UdpSocket::bind(SocketAddr::new(ip, 0)).is_ok()
 }