v0.31.4

2026-10-11 13:56:30 +02:00
1 parent 95c55da2ee
commit d942c1a35d
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 Read README.md, ROADMAP.md and docs/TEST_REPORT.md before making changes.
 The project name is RustProxy; the Cargo package/binary remains `rust-proxy` for
-compatibility. Current source version: 0.31.3.
+compatibility. Current source version: 0.31.4.
 ## Delivery
@@ -3,6 +3,13 @@
 > Operator-facing release history. Historical engineering notes are kept in
 > [`docs/CHANGELOG_TECHNICAL_ARCHIVE.md`](docs/CHANGELOG_TECHNICAL_ARCHIVE.md).
 ## 0.31.4
 - Correct the administration panel's handling of intermittent `auth.invalid_origin` with optional explicit HTTPS `administration.public_origin` when behind a trusted reverse proxy. Allow a bounded, HTTPS-first multi-hop forwarded-proto chain without trusting arbitrary forwarding headers.
 - Use a single public panel URL: automatically include its hostname in the panel's effective Host allowlist. Keep `allowed_hosts` as optional **additional** DNS entries in an advanced section and deduplicate legacy repeated values on edit/save without an automatic database migration.
 - Preserve strict Host, forwarded-Host, Origin, Fetch Metadata, CSRF and trusted-proxy checks; keep public proxy routes and SQLite schema unchanged.
 - Add configuration and HTTP guard simulations, Rust source regression tests, English/Polish form labels and operator documentation. Rust/Cargo build and live mobile acceptance are still outstanding.
 ## 0.31.3
 - Prevent duplicate session requests after BFCache/tab restoration; suspend SSE/polling until session validation finishes, then resume once. Replace automatic resume reload loops with a visible, localized retry screen and preserve the startup recovery limit until initialization is complete.
@@ -1881,7 +1881,7 @@ dependencies = [
 [[package]]
 name = "rust-proxy"
-version = "0.31.3"
+version = "0.31.4"
 dependencies = [
 "anyhow",
 "arc-swap",
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 [package]
 name = "rust-proxy"
-version = "0.31.3"
+version = "0.31.4"
 edition = "2021"
 rust-version = "1.99"
 description = "RustProxy - independent reverse proxy with local administration"
@@ -1,11 +1,13 @@
-# RustProxy 0.31.3
+# RustProxy 0.31.4
 **0.31.0 panel/cache additions:** browser-negotiated Zstd/Brotli/gzip for HTML, JS and CSS (Settings → Administration); optional HTTP BAN/PURGE restricted to explicit IP/CIDR allowlist (Settings → Cache, disabled by default); System information Refresh button beside the API badge. See [Settings](docs/SETTINGS.md) and [Cache](docs/CACHE.md).
 Independent Rust reverse proxy and static Web Server with a dashboard, SQLite configuration,
 streaming HTTP/TLS/WebSocket forwarding, raw TCP/UDP stream hosts, IP-bound vhosts and backend pools.
-**0.31.3 mobile-session recovery patch source (Cargo verification required).**
+**0.31.4 administration Origin pinning and simplified one-field configuration (Cargo verification required).**
 **Reissued source package:** this package supersedes the earlier 0.31.4 archive under the same version number. Update/version checks cannot distinguish the two by version alone; rebuild/redeploy explicitly and verify the package SHA-256.
 ## Layer-4 streams
@@ -13,7 +15,16 @@ Raw TCP/UDP forwarding has its own **Streams** page in the primary navigation, a
 Named HTTP/HTTPS listener bind addresses use the same chip-style editor as vhost hostnames, including multi-address listeners.
-## What changed in 0.31.3
+## What changed in 0.31.4
 - Fix intermittent `auth.invalid_origin` on the **administration panel only** behind a trusted reverse proxy. The optional `administration.public_origin` pins the browser-facing HTTPS origin and allows a bounded `X-Forwarded-Proto: https, http` chain when the immediate proxy peer is trusted. Without a pin, ambiguous forwarded-proto values still return HTTP 403.
 - Set **only** `administration.public_origin`, for example `https://panel.example.test`, in Settings → Administration. Its DNS hostname is automatically included in the panel Host allowlist; it does **not** need to be repeated in `allowed_hosts`.
 - The advanced **Additional allowed DNS hostnames** section remains optional. Older configurations with a duplicate pinned hostname still load, and editing/saving omits that duplicate while preserving independent entries. Removing or changing the pinned URL never silently keeps the previous hostname implicitly allowed.
 - Keep strict checks for foreign `Origin`, mismatched or duplicate `X-Forwarded-Host`, cross-site requests, CSRF and untrusted proxies. The narrow opt-in self-admin session-cookie path may use the derived hostname only under its existing local-listener-risk conditions. Public proxy traffic and SQLite schema 9 are unchanged.
 - Restart RustProxy after modifying the setting. See [Administration HTTPS](docs/SETTINGS.md) and [0.31.4 implementation and tests](docs/IMPLEMENTATION_0.31.4.md).
 - **Release gate remains open:** Rust/Cargo compilation, resolved dependency lockfile and real mobile/reverse-proxy acceptance are still required before production deployment.
 ## Previously in 0.31.3
 - Correct mobile tab/BFCache recovery: share in-flight session validation across resume events and defer SSE/polling until verification succeeds. A failed check keeps a visible retry UI instead of reloading the page, and 401 still requires a fresh login.
 - Preserve the one-time initial Origin reload guard until **full** panel initialization succeeds. Authenticated dashboard navigation rejected for invalid Origin now returns a visible 403 HTML explanation rather than raw JSON; API requests retain JSON errors and the same Origin/Sec-Fetch-Site authorization policy.
@@ -1,5 +1,14 @@
 # RustProxy roadmap
 ## 0.31.4 - Administration-only public HTTPS Origin with one-field configuration
 - [x] Add explicit HTTPS `administration.public_origin` and restrict its use to trusted reverse-proxy peers for panel requests.
 - [x] Derive the pinned DNS hostname for the effective Host allowlist without duplicating it in saved `allowed_hosts`.
 - [x] Keep additional allowed DNS hostnames in an advanced panel field and remove redundant legacy duplicates on edit/save.
 - [x] Preserve strict Origin, CSRF, trusted proxy, forwarded Host and HTTPS-first header checks and the opt-in self-admin session-cookie boundary.
 - [x] Add panel settings UI, translations, API schema, Rust source regressions and Node simulations without changing public proxy forwarding.
 - [ ] Resolve Cargo dependencies, compile and test Rust, and perform real mobile/reverse-proxy acceptance before production deployment.
 ## 0.31.3 - Mobile session recovery and Origin diagnostics
 - [x] Reproduce the overlapping resume-session checks, reload-loop marker reset and early SSE restart using the 0.31.2 source in a deterministic JavaScript simulation.
@@ -1,18 +1,18 @@
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@@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ e52b31d0abf65ae3034f6cb367cca113633014ce8d1d799ad4dd5624d2c7b8bb  docker-agent/n
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 9113f3abbfe81bafc4855d8680df8aa2a381ecc358cc3e1a0f78b6b756421117  docs/CACHE_DIAGNOSTICS.md
@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ befa50579e3475b22589f26380d85b3345b80e4fa947d49649a3b91a8dd8b8c2  docs/CUSTOM_LO
 5301e321611d494fd97b04ab648df1f66a6a0d1f1f4c3475eab485e138d5605b  docs/IMPLEMENTATION_0.31.0.md
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@@ -55,7 +56,7 @@ e7516646dfb107d6240370f4e7460b1189f2eb21f398740381d5d102847bbfe6  docs/NOT_FOUND
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-e87c81d2eb2e90d5b1ea9e40abb81a65ca81593eb5cc3e39717b818c9a75b287  docs/README.md
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@@ -64,9 +65,9 @@ a2bb837cdd3559d58158880c1f832badf64035376a3623050bb4e40c2bca104c  docs/ROADMAP_H
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@@ -138,8 +139,8 @@ cb01fdef286f38b442dd9252c23c4f8e44eb72e9ecdd99adb926e8e9f6318bb1  integrations/r
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@@ -165,7 +166,7 @@ a641bd35400c56f3b68b0a92e97b602d06090f03972ca8f01fa744e90dd97403  scripts/deploy
 2cc658faaa610b21b48942c59b955525539ad4503fd60f2a49c7e626a22faaff  scripts/migration/migrate_npm.py
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-3d8cfbc8177ef82f28dfba3fd555955dac4a29003267f93572ea26a98fb8255e  scripts/resolve_dependencies_0312.sh
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 22e880e98c7b9d700c7a4c02b9b1d543e5dbd1f4ecdca42813a1083165b32a19  scripts/version.py
@@ -180,17 +181,17 @@ b9e57db4bd80ef37564dfc533a96897d8a494671d53acea9fb4bf28d23ba370d  src/acme/provi
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@@ -200,12 +201,12 @@ d9e90166d2199152585a5208feedfc1dd1395dc32ddbd2a094ae4a1aee45e115  src/admin/pref
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@@ -216,6 +217,7 @@ cadd7dca29b9aad8c77c7bc23dd249ea37a15adfa4d636a8ef00273a91ce35dc  src/admin/tail
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 bffa6611f3776e97d0065b510b63f083aabf7b3429fcc5cb26b1883fdb7c47dd  src/admin/tests/part_10.rs
 578f93cc5771b5858813945e5608b15c572bd3d7fd15bae291d292e2994ece25  src/admin/tests/part_11.rs
 48fcd818c522fe80f2c7b2e218f87de6a7772ffd0a24e93502780b03ec78e335  src/admin/web/acme.js
 446011c2c7afddf7734ceb268c75a3b4146dbe8e915b11986495e956b6c62c69  src/admin/web/app/config-history.js
 9527dcafb9c14e420cb841a6984d373ba2136d07c45350e9368dd7a88e89af22  src/admin/web/app/core.js
@@ -240,14 +242,14 @@ e6c4d91d1542d0a5b47bb8736f9539d43a6713df5a473b635519d5b7eac2eb9c  src/admin/web/
 0a5fff35555153f59d4346933030a67b6e1a8768cee7a47cfa2fcf1a2c564f63  src/admin/web/favicon.svg
 af6e7a2e890df2fb7385a374bcb3fba52fb5a53dbe18adc1fb7865660fcba842  src/admin/web/file-logs.js
 b14e7b3578322f309627f6fe965cc16abcf85da3437c9070be6caecae1908743  src/admin/web/host404.js
-8490011e8164e6fab9601ff75a82eef3cc7972d1fdb8e8c4f73df5796ae72d37  src/admin/web/index.html
+7994b44abf769243ff3a21d248d3eb79f26736c7730bd94978c29be08b3f07ef  src/admin/web/index.html
 24db88842707f764064657712d3660c6ac129fbfb47d188c0903925cf8244ce5  src/admin/web/integrations.js
 7a12f020fc587205694978ab41b660e9a80487d413fbf6e34fc525eabc58308f  src/admin/web/login-keys.json
 af0fbd94d9b88ce1cce28e39dfd2c35de031adcba412dd4a9a17d9b416c256dd  src/admin/web/login.html
 99fe9b8ba7a8a24e5bbe9ae40999484fe13b0faf5eb1d7a9193701f667e51ca5  src/admin/web/login.js
 21ddae9743ca545c89f6df0db40810dd680812e58f2b2b6875ed64fd8fb97ac6  src/admin/web/management.js
 90d9a0836662135b79fb6f183c4f3eff60f8a64392d6c5795ccf1d8ef6862263  src/admin/web/redirects.js
-df6efd27b1ebe1fafeb0dc6061b69be9aa46f71451f0fcdd00e2f7ef8692d3cb  src/admin/web/settings.js
+8fcad0d1a161ac6f45d773d1dc3925db2d32b34bdbe57595924f84eacb4f9136  src/admin/web/settings.js
 bb67e77af5514478485cfb69f339d63d7eb0cbadd093fa054814a416260ccc1d  src/admin/web/streams.js
 c4f051f54293156803b48c04d972e9d5a290209826138ce15356d19adf569979  src/admin/web/style.css
 d01b615635c7373981b0633cc27298a34e67fe0cbe9d1384d277d46f0cafb1b4  src/admin/web/traffic-panel.js
@@ -396,7 +398,7 @@ e03f0d6b3f35dae6b98c394837aa0d17e4d73a8306767b4c607868bc00c30286  src/prometheus
 59095a04707c2e4714358f4462dcf21c41952474b9b815c42bbd14e96c573846  src/prometheus/web_php.rs
 b5856fd38a957b2ca9c7e3606d84d13d5cfcf3a45b487b15ae1d2dc248cbda57  src/proxy/body.rs
 16b9d4db3b20b2ab14c47ac14fcd18d3d8ca77c3ad9a1f37866ebfa60f379862  src/proxy/body/tests.rs
-f0cb26ed34c35bacc74b914457acac8a611390de14cf46e2e6d3bcc848e914e8  src/proxy/cache_helpers.rs
+d3126b44f0a32d60421bb5afe8e83adf4a253faf7dc77f500bce8fe5d78b9d74  src/proxy/cache_helpers.rs
 aa49c9928bb91e3d5bae0d340d88396a0417b9edec6192d41e1403533319a897  src/proxy/cache_http_invalidation.rs
 771cc1a38927f96e593b144dbab66cd64a5dc0ed42d54b1615c359845b2b7223  src/proxy/error_fallback.rs
 bf2e6bbd64fb45fceed54af0bff1c1e00da22b79c64dd8f5c23d2af0dbab0b7d  src/proxy/forward/cache_lookup.rs
@@ -426,7 +428,7 @@ d40ad63939097d2b91339127d5835a74b618d83b7ba31db0c512f05a82107d6e  src/redirect.r
 811c83ae9fd0f5a13d35b5443cd37843f82b9d600bee4bb136ba9b87732a5347  src/redirect/tests.rs
 d0939e1b0829c25356a0b67ecb3a178c74936dd07baa15fee24eb32544db6cad  src/runtime.rs
 4e0b25c2b86eefddd76c64b39dc1c1cd6d243addc32cdea99e6c3ac84ed879a6  src/runtime/certificates.rs
-2752a1122f22cab7af9ccdd23cd0aa6d99a73f1d82614814217a3875927d7eef  src/runtime/constructors.rs
+8d2443df8dab1ce6f11878e991b4928046b7362c417c5703f6d1f3a977646cbe  src/runtime/constructors.rs
 31dc5cdea00efd63594dc6becd5a9103594696145cbc8e7b7594fb407214ad9d  src/runtime/docker.rs
 e90df3fff8a25465425b099ae358d19085809e56d948ba47e01e53f8b93d5dd0  src/runtime/tests.rs
 0046525317ffbd5d3b34845656b0f58d9d31f38b3d8acd71e90d94bd7cdfb8ab  src/runtime/types.rs
@@ -441,8 +443,9 @@ f2f6196632b2fdb2444189624f961edaf5bdfff57f700b0207b57e2491c1daa5  src/server/htt
 71899a9b1897fa22ab9e8eb6a670054a6d382bad78714006b9b218d07ba99902  src/server/serve.rs
 e9e478cf45b88994eaffd115f51764b6b07852ee3c941cafdabb20584d3dabc0  src/server/serve/tests.rs
 048f2c7a8ef698a172ba7ed844558f4118b367b2cf340748c5c28da7723d8e85  src/server/tls_runtime.rs
-623e1b24c17f2149c712bc9fe38ca23c503e88891f5eef1b5ceef6cbf8cf9093  src/settings.rs
+73ec453ac2850f6963f5bc33401cb8c92aa26d5123f15d68e6633860d91f265e  src/settings.rs
-3b3893d899b8e82969588f30c1e0aeff250449e4c94627ff5ad94d29f227ceca  src/settings/tests.rs
+240ecdd70e8662ff3b84c21830dc0cbbbacadd755d56146e54214bc2887f068c  src/settings/public_origin.rs
 1f1121c3562c8f8f3fdee2113be2afffb8849be2d303e4c4409f87478b6e3307  src/settings/tests.rs
 566daf9c0e1a30da2dc18e51090541a85ced3320a0fc00ed1d1de3e2b4da5072  src/stream.rs
 46d9f63ce13a634e00f38d36ca3bdb217f2e37f04d75a4ef118e7dac9896a489  src/stream/model.rs
 9c59bdb856106c0a74d1f8c156b0dd7289a170322ea556bad19bb8de3bf13d69  src/stream/runtime.rs
@@ -522,28 +525,31 @@ eecf680f001f2110dde4eceaccf2f922859a16c946a644f8854e8de4d3771f7c  tests/policies
 728999110a6d8cacb62bc0399bc333fa23a66526ee23f563a3c93bf00e5fad19  tests/transport_config.rs
 b04362ad082a32c9ccc4cf38c46f44d71347adecf7aba3224b3af3ea4872e3d0  tools/README.md
 358c1e94dd2b4a756430e5335747f0b437345b1713670a9972c5bcf78b837ccb  tools/audit/admin_audit.py
 1a7ff9b28ade57b99d054c703496b51949dd1a8e7ed67bc5630f94a7df258cb5  tools/checks/admin_panel_config_0314_ui_test.mjs
 e5c58fc9b7685ec911bfa86f6ca4f0cc97c19a90c0cff5b60ea9887f1afe9ced  tools/checks/admin_public_origin_0314_config_sim.mjs
 0060f8217640403c6af2d5091fdc9087d0fb2fc30cd545a3c58277a396d8121c  tools/checks/admin_public_origin_0314_sim.mjs
 fd082812411cff7afb71b2289a6f1a469b8d3c8a7cfdcdd9e567a2a4baf81be4  tools/checks/admin_surface_audit_0310.py
 412255d383fcc8306c6086784fb416d9814e3ec790e440a0927431ca615f3411  tools/checks/backend_cache_0297_ui_test.mjs
 2a493dbce2991a23d807c01952f58608a364f541560836b4cb385e75e108e9e7  tools/checks/backend_health_0300_ui_test.mjs
-bebe46609381f2050d90c809e9b5ac7b564d5b26f733a926f20e5363a4140d34  tools/checks/check_source.py
+54c73f3c0a63d0345bbe14a538503a9c63b6a9ff1925e7e51acbce38abd370e9  tools/checks/check_source.py
 0b583ee59dcccc35b15ef4e211d7e6546a8aaa7b0286ceab03c0b0dc084c1e07  tools/checks/dashboard_boot_0311_ui_test.mjs
 259d4b0985c82b631e151a07e8ef3b4c760019cb99bb2af458ce577497f7df58  tools/checks/dashboard_startup_0310_ui_test.mjs
-6adc94ee148508a2e46f073eb6f3b89c4057983dea12c976ae7332fb8423ce41  tools/checks/dependency_upgrade_0312.py
+76884f3c44f18c36eff3a1968aa173d2d782fa8d31ed7cc63e4ff41853488672  tools/checks/dependency_upgrade_0312.py
-dd7b7512f5a988c1fe6fdbdeb78c3b0d33a23b57335eb4f881296cb252d8692c  tools/checks/docs_check.py
+9add103198795111ccf1b3197cdd2586f54f606d152ff92be2ae09beb628d5aa  tools/checks/docs_check.py
 e33a9cc51d58bc92a637c0e6a1c88cbd24ba4605be55748212e296c3c35a4060  tools/checks/high_traffic_memory_model.py
 4f7821e7e25b09ce251d25a0b3fb4d8ce8396c36a5ed971c2637aeb325425909  tools/checks/langs_check.py
 f8f87ba891338b565249d02c3cf5f02cec44e606b4205de99fcbea1eb2c24d57  tools/checks/memory_contracts.py
 af98579ee942e774d88775c261ac351847c28bb4a5396dc67e458bd6b1ff7963  tools/checks/origin_resume_0313_ui_test.mjs
-5b7901747d879e12a39ed82b6efc513bcdddd15d508b5828210d2c83398fb6a4  tools/checks/panel_cache_http_0310_ui_test.mjs
+b432ea24933ba28ae819d900892f7ada268560e2816234820394084d6296b595  tools/checks/panel_cache_http_0310_ui_test.mjs
-7770cc0b1b70255003d19b63210cc3e21ca9c8804cb56c2fe01eaf2e04ebb0fa  tools/checks/preflight.py
+300c114c05f66be214bc2e06187fc4d0063e3dc3cd55f44c43c2e43cbd3106f2  tools/checks/preflight.py
 021a97bd6763b59f3f7eca15f51efdf88d0c863f1f81a2e42ba80a9a09ca3fec  tools/checks/refresh_0310_ui_test.mjs
-951d184c67cf3b006f89dc6588f460797fcad9c15460f6638abd8316f8777736  tools/checks/release_smoke.py
+e24a81c06deceab7f4d3c3bf596712d3eeb70b884c731820637461fbc93aa975  tools/checks/release_smoke.py
 f69845bc26ec33160fc756953991cf32aa8ad6a7fb4a131caa2093db91e783ef  tools/checks/rust_module_contracts.py
 ecfe0bb21a7549225a19b0846bb6de8c99cbfbbf5a706d33cf84db2c7146abed  tools/checks/rust_source.py
 adf84a983e0dbba228e47d71ec2d5c9964f7ca9989d5139de58f96ee961b035a  tools/checks/security_contracts.py
 23b9250245e6bec5ef728c73cee4c88f64924afc3597f8a9b58a1924235df98e  tools/checks/security_dependency_contracts.py
 0d211440ae77f16187a5d833156911c7793ed27ac1d77e79de362e47c1ab1abd  tools/checks/source_module_contracts.py
-51afd5f31eeea8f1658d239dd34637d38a0a7eb1fb9f58a212040505d3b39b0c  tools/checks/system_info_0301_ui_test.mjs
+b87c6c5b5d5335e95b3afc00f7c9035ddccc5ca1394a4425abcf898092da053a  tools/checks/system_info_0301_ui_test.mjs
 543a488951ea6ec8fe06e04f168ccc4d4f2af3cfc281c9a728ab7bd87377fa98  tools/checks/system_info_no_subprocess_contracts.py
 614ed0c775e32ec5bfb4ee75aaa90206a10da0f43659747a7ec76fd93e33767a  tools/checks/version_contracts.py
 161637cb5e2e613e3c71cf8489cc936fa84913a2a02649463f8893a28a674242  tools/checks/vhost_origin_errors_0297_ui_test.mjs
@@ -552,7 +558,7 @@ adf84a983e0dbba228e47d71ec2d5c9964f7ca9989d5139de58f96ee961b035a  tools/checks/s
 0398892be30fe416a00578915c588f360fd93244e3af77ece834e560e547d1c8  tools/checks/web_server_contracts.py
 35f76060e585a96c623ef83bd5f771969f5be16a0e1ae626a3092d7458b84e84  tools/checks/web_service_ui_test.mjs
 adaa1ed9e5958739df40190055c780c80d0a8e270ec8dc105ed3fa2dbb8fb74f  tools/checks/www_redirect_ui_test.mjs
-cfa2dee224a11bf3948dbe528f5877a76b830b7efb01cd785007213cc245493d  tools/dev/memory_load.py
+ddee9083a349b2a56b9ebe5742b5c91b668f31143762bac7d939068fbd2ee7a6  tools/dev/memory_load.py
 d1418f8e574a7390fd45a2aa879bdf5720b773162d65e295ab0350506aa5220a  tools/dev/mock_auth.py
 2d3ff92300b09ce9cecbbaaa9309b4d33160fa4b2291c9952b784e8cfb599ab5  tools/dev/mock_server.py
 538b5f6cfa738355a729940ee3d92e7ab3dc25ca69ae330ddaa08f831775b8ba  tools/dev/test_compression.py
@@ -111,6 +111,9 @@ if [[ "$mode" == "test" ]]; then
        node tools/checks/dashboard_startup_0310_ui_test.mjs
        node tools/checks/dashboard_boot_0311_ui_test.mjs
        node tools/checks/origin_resume_0313_ui_test.mjs
        node tools/checks/admin_public_origin_0314_sim.mjs
        node tools/checks/admin_public_origin_0314_config_sim.mjs
        node tools/checks/admin_panel_config_0314_ui_test.mjs
        node tools/checks/panel_cache_http_0310_ui_test.mjs
        node tools/checks/vhost_origin_errors_0297_ui_test.mjs
        node tools/checks/www_redirect_ui_test.mjs
@@ -65,9 +65,9 @@ The `rustproxy_session` cookie is HttpOnly, SameSite=Strict and Path=/ with the
 administration adds the Secure attribute; behind a trusted HTTPS-terminating reverse proxy
 the external forwarded scheme controls that flag. A protected SSH/VPN tunnel remains valid,
 while direct remote administration should use HTTPS plus firewall/private-network policy.
-Direct IP/localhost Host values must use the actual administration port. A DNS name explicitly
+Direct IP/localhost Host values must use the actual administration port. A DNS name explicitly listed in `administration.allowed_hosts`, or automatically
-listed in `administration.allowed_hosts` represents the browser-facing authority and may use
+derived from the validated `administration.public_origin`, represents the
-the trusted reverse proxy's external port. Foreign Origin/cross-site requests are rejected.
+browser-facing authority and may use the trusted reverse proxy's external port. Foreign Origin/cross-site requests are rejected.
 There is no permissive CORS mode.
 Auth request bodies are limited to 4096 bytes.
@@ -9,16 +9,17 @@ new bind address and allow explicit DNS hostnames. A persisted non-loopback bind
 accepted when HTTPS is enabled. The legacy startup flags remain only for deliberately
 plain remote HTTP. Public vhost `/docs` paths are not captured by the admin listener.
-When the dashboard is published through a trusted reverse proxy, an explicit
+When the dashboard is published through a trusted reverse proxy, the hostname of
-`administration.allowed_hosts` DNS entry is matched against the external authority rather
+the optional `administration.public_origin` is automatically allowed for panel
-than the private admin socket port. `X-Forwarded-Host` is trusted only from loopback or a
+Host validation. Any extra `administration.allowed_hosts` DNS entry is also
 matched against the external authority rather than the private admin socket port. `X-Forwarded-Host` is trusted only from loopback or a
 configured trusted proxy; the external `X-Forwarded-Proto` additionally requires the
 forwarded-proto trust setting except for loopback. Origin/CSRF checks and Secure cookies use
 that external origin. Direct IP/localhost access still requires the real administration port.
 ### Publishing the panel through RustProxy itself
-0.16.0 supports the explicitly opted-in same-process topology where a public HTTPS vhost proxies to the local administration listener. The reserved `rustproxy_session` cookie is passed through only when all of these conditions are true: the browser-facing request is TLS, its DNS hostname is explicitly present in `administration.allowed_hosts`, the selected backend directly addresses the configured administration socket by IP, and that backend has `accept_local_listener_risk=true`. The control-plane route is forced out of shared cache.
+0.16.0 supports the explicitly opted-in same-process topology where a public HTTPS vhost proxies to the local administration listener. The reserved `rustproxy_session` cookie is passed through only when all of these conditions are true: the browser-facing request is TLS, its DNS hostname either matches the pinned `administration.public_origin` or is explicitly listed in `administration.allowed_hosts`, the selected backend directly addresses the configured administration socket by IP, and that backend has `accept_local_listener_risk=true`. The control-plane route is forced out of shared cache.
 This is a narrow exception to the normal isolation rule. For every ordinary backend RustProxy still removes `rustproxy_session` before forwarding requests and strips an upstream attempt to set that cookie in responses. DNS backend names are not accepted for the special self-admin cookie path. This prevents a normal application backend from reading or replacing the administration session.
@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
 # RustProxy 0.31.4 - Administration-panel Origin pinning and simplified HTTPS settings
 ## Scope
 Only the **administration panel/control-plane authentication** and its settings,
 OpenAPI, translations and regression tests change. No public vhost/proxy routing,
 backend forwarding, stream, session-store or database schema behavior is altered.
 Credential-based certificate API automation remains on its existing validation
 path. The 0.31.3 BFCache, manual retry, SSE/polling and startup error protection
 remains unchanged.
 ## Evidence and failure mode
 0.31.3's `external_admin_scheme` rejects a trusted
 `X-Forwarded-Proto: https, http` value with `auth.invalid_origin` and reason
 `external_scheme` before checking a session, even for `GET /api/auth/session`
 without an `Origin` header. This may appear intermittently if a multi-hop
 reverse proxy sometimes appends rather than replaces the header. The previous
 Node.js HTTP reconstruction reproduced this with 3/12 intentionally malformed
 GETs; it does **not** prove the real user's reverse proxy behaves that way.
 ## Patch design
 `administration.public_origin` is an **optional, explicit HTTPS origin**:
 - Requires one canonical DNS hostname; that hostname is derived for the effective
  panel Host allowlist without repeating it in `administration.allowed_hosts`.
  The setting forbids credentials, userinfo, path, query, fragment, HTTP and ambiguous input.
 - Is active only after restart and only when the immediate TCP peer is loopback
  or is already in the configured trusted-proxy list. It does not implicitly
  trust another proxy or the browser's `Host`/forwarding headers.
 - Keeps checking the actual request `Host` against the administration listener
  policy. If a forwarded Host exists, it must be a **single** authority and
  match the pinned host and effective port. Malformed/userinfo/duplicate values
  are rejected.
 - For the pinned panel, accepts a bounded (maximum eight hops) protocol chain
  only if the *first* hop is literally `https` and every hop is `http` or
  `https`. This permits `https, http` but not `http`, `http, https`, `ftp`,
  empty values, or arbitrarily long chains. Missing XFP is allowed only
  because the explicit administrator pin defines the external HTTPS identity.
 - Uses the configured origin for the browser `Origin` comparison, correct
  `Secure` session cookie and the existing CSRF checks. Existing
  `Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site` blocking is unchanged.
 - Does **not** alter the validation path when the pin is absent, the peer is
  untrusted, or certificate-automation credentials are present.
 On every rejection, the existing bounded, credential-redacted diagnostics
 remain available. New `pinned_origin_mismatch` identifies a disagreement with
 the explicit pin. Do not log cookies, CSRF tokens or Authorization headers.
 ## Simplified hostname configuration (included in this 0.31.4 reissue)
 ### Operator change
 For the panel behind a trusted reverse proxy, **Settings -> Administration**
 now needs only the **Public panel HTTPS origin** such as
 `https://panel.example.test`. The DNS hostname comes from this validated
 administrator setting; it need not (and should not) be repeated in
 `administration.allowed_hosts`. Additional DNS hostnames remain in an optional
 **Advanced** section. Only those extra names are stored in the allowlist.
 Backend validation also canonicalizes any duplicate hostname in memory.
 The settings page suppresses this value when loading an older configuration and omits it on the next save.
 Other explicitly allowed hosts remain. Removing/changing the pin does not automatically retain the old
 hostname as an extra allowlist entry. For legacy duplicated values, this
 normalization occurs **only when the administrator saves**; there is no
 silent SQLite mutation on startup.
 ### Configuration example
 ```json
 {
  "administration": {
    "public_origin": "https://panel.example.test",
    "allowed_hosts": []
  }
 }
 ```
 This field still requires an HTTPS URL with one DNS hostname and an optional
 port; userinfo, fragment, path, HTTP, IP literals and localhost remain invalid.
 Changing either access-control field needs a RustProxy restart.
 ### Implementation and security
 - `Administration::validate` normalizes the public URL independently of the
  optional additional DNS list. `Administration::include_public_origin_host`
  generates an **effective runtime/desired** Host allowlist once on startup /
  status read, without adding to the persisted configuration or accepting a
  wildcard. The originally saved allowlist is unchanged.
 - `admin_host_allowed` and `configured_admin_public_authority` continue to
  check the actual Host and the trusted last-hop proxy. Forwarded Host remains
  single and identical to the pin. Only a bounded, first-hop HTTPS
  X-Forwarded-Proto chain can be used with the explicit pin; no arbitrary
  Origin or `Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site` or missing CSRF is permitted.
 - The explicitly opted-in self-admin vhost case may pass the reserved session
  cookie when the incoming HTTPS host equals the pin; it still requires a
  backend targeting the administration listener directly by IP and the prior
  `accept_local_listener_risk` opt-in. No other proxy traffic changes.
 - No new configuration key or SQLite migration. Older `allowed_hosts` lists
  remain accepted, preserving backwards compatibility. Existing 0.31.3
  mobile/BFCache recovery is untouched.
 ### Tests and acceptance gate
 New Rust source tests also cover pin-only saved configuration, derived runtime
 allowlist, additional legacy entries, changes/removal, invalid URL input,
 same-origin session and `Secure` cookie, foreign Origin, untrusted peers,
 forwarded-host spoofing and CSRF. Node.js runs a focused real settings-helper
 test and a local HTTP simulation of the guard; these **do not** execute the
 Rust server. Exact results are recorded in [TEST_REPORT](TEST_REPORT.md).
 Production acceptance remains OPEN until Rust 1.99+ builds/tests pass with a
 resolved Cargo.lock; a trusted reverse proxy and real mobile Chrome/Safari
 are checked for repeated BFCache resumes, session expiry and negative
 Origin/Host/CSRF cases. Never weaken the trusted-proxy list or disable Origin
 validation to avoid `auth.invalid_origin`.
 ## Test coverage
 Rust source tests in `src/settings/tests.rs` and `src/admin/tests/part_11.rs`
 cover config parsing/normalization, persisted legacy defaults, restart gating,
 trusted/foreign hosts, unknown/duplicate headers, cross-site metadata, HTTP
 first hops, genuine same-origin session GET with multi-hop metadata, HTTPS
 `Secure` session cookie, CSRF enforcement and opt-out behavior.
 `tools/checks/admin_public_origin_0314_sim.mjs` and
 `tools/checks/admin_public_origin_0314_config_sim.mjs` perform additional HTTP
 guard *simulations*, not compiled RustProxy execution.
 `tools/checks/admin_panel_config_0314_ui_test.mjs` checks the settings UI and form behavior. Record its result in
 `docs/TEST_REPORT.md` only after it is run.
 ## Required production acceptance
 1. `bash scripts/resolve_dependencies_0312.sh` on a Rust 1.99+ builder with
   network/local audited dependencies; inspect regenerated lockfile.
 2. `./dev.sh check && ./dev.sh test && ./dev.sh release` and Go tests.
 3. Set an exact HTTPS panel origin (no duplicate DNS allowlist entry), restart, and verify
   with a trusted real edge proxy. Keep RustProxy administration listening on
   an isolated/private socket. Verify the first trusted hop sanitizes headers.
 4. On iOS Safari and Android Chrome, perform 20+ visibility/BFCache resumes,
   full refreshes, sessions renewed/expired, and a deliberate temporary 403.
   Check HTTP 200 for valid `/api/auth/session` and `Secure` cookie; no reload
   loops, blank screens, request floods, or leaked SSE/polling tasks.
 5. Inject cross-origin, duplicate/foreign forwarded Host, downgraded protocol,
   missing CSRF and untrusted-source requests; they must still fail. Confirm
   certificate API automation and public vhosts behave identically to 0.31.3.
 The original production cause cannot be declared fixed without representative
 mobile/reverse-proxy request logs. This artifact is not compiler-verified unless
 the release-host gate above passes.
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@ This is the canonical index for the current project documentation. The authentic
 - [0.26.3 implementation note](V0.26.3_IMPLEMENTATION.md) - global interface scaling, chart themes, square draft dock and Settings navigation polish.
 - [0.26.2 implementation note](V0.26.2_IMPLEMENTATION.md) - unified Logs navigation, field-query search, dynamic JSON columns and RAW parsing.
 - [0.26.1 implementation note](V0.26.1_IMPLEMENTATION.md) - historical vhost-aware protocol logging and Stored Logs UX milestone.
 - [0.31.4 administration public Origin and settings](IMPLEMENTATION_0.31.4.md) - opt-in HTTPS origin, one-field DNS allowlist, additional hosts in advanced settings, legacy deduplication, CSRF and remaining deployment checks.
 - [0.31.3 mobile session / invalid-Origin recovery](IMPLEMENTATION_0.31.3.md) - deterministic BFCache and visibility session coordination, 403 diagnostics, recovery and remaining acceptance.
 - [0.31.1 mobile panel bootstrap](IMPLEMENTATION_0.31.1.md) - panel script readiness, versioned assets, failure recovery and acceptance tests.
 - [0.31.0 security audit](SECURITY_AUDIT_0.31.0.md) - current API/panel/BAN/PURGE attack-surface review, hardening and remaining runtime verification.
@@ -82,7 +83,7 @@ This is the canonical index for the current project documentation. The authentic
 ## Historical or version-labelled context
-Version-labelled `V*.md` files are retained as historical implementation/audit records. Their version number describes the audited milestone. The current release implementation note is [IMPLEMENTATION_0.31.3.md](IMPLEMENTATION_0.31.3.md); [IMPLEMENTATION_0.31.1.md](IMPLEMENTATION_0.31.1.md) is retained as the prior mobile milestone; [IMPLEMENTATION_0.31.0.md](IMPLEMENTATION_0.31.0.md) is retained as the previous milestone; [V0.29.1_IMPLEMENTATION.md](V0.29.1_IMPLEMENTATION.md) is retained as historical context, and [V0.29.0_IMPLEMENTATION.md](V0.29.0_IMPLEMENTATION.md) is retained as the prior redirect/health/cache/log milestone; [V0.28.2_IMPLEMENTATION.md](V0.28.2_IMPLEMENTATION.md) is retained as the prior certificate-hardening milestone; [V0.28.1_IMPLEMENTATION.md](V0.28.1_IMPLEMENTATION.md) is retained as the prior external-path milestone; [V0.28.0_IMPLEMENTATION.md](V0.28.0_IMPLEMENTATION.md) is retained as the prior GeoIP/listener/cache milestone, and [V0.27.3_IMPLEMENTATION.md](V0.27.3_IMPLEMENTATION.md) is retained as the prior HTTP/3/cache-maintenance milestone, [V0.27.2_IMPLEMENTATION.md](V0.27.2_IMPLEMENTATION.md) is retained as the prior managed-ACME repair, [V0.27.1_IMPLEMENTATION.md](V0.27.1_IMPLEMENTATION.md) as the prior managed-runtime/list-sorting milestone, and older version notes remain historical evidence. The latest retained audit is [V0.25.5_AUDIT.md](V0.25.5_AUDIT.md); older audit files remain available for traceability.
+Version-labelled `V*.md` files are retained as historical implementation/audit records. Their version number describes the audited milestone. The current release implementation note is [IMPLEMENTATION_0.31.4.md](IMPLEMENTATION_0.31.4.md); [IMPLEMENTATION_0.31.3.md](IMPLEMENTATION_0.31.3.md) is retained as the previous mobile recovery milestone; [IMPLEMENTATION_0.31.1.md](IMPLEMENTATION_0.31.1.md) is retained as the prior mobile milestone; [IMPLEMENTATION_0.31.0.md](IMPLEMENTATION_0.31.0.md) is retained as the previous milestone; [V0.29.1_IMPLEMENTATION.md](V0.29.1_IMPLEMENTATION.md) is retained as historical context, and [V0.29.0_IMPLEMENTATION.md](V0.29.0_IMPLEMENTATION.md) is retained as the prior redirect/health/cache/log milestone; [V0.28.2_IMPLEMENTATION.md](V0.28.2_IMPLEMENTATION.md) is retained as the prior certificate-hardening milestone; [V0.28.1_IMPLEMENTATION.md](V0.28.1_IMPLEMENTATION.md) is retained as the prior external-path milestone; [V0.28.0_IMPLEMENTATION.md](V0.28.0_IMPLEMENTATION.md) is retained as the prior GeoIP/listener/cache milestone, and [V0.27.3_IMPLEMENTATION.md](V0.27.3_IMPLEMENTATION.md) is retained as the prior HTTP/3/cache-maintenance milestone, [V0.27.2_IMPLEMENTATION.md](V0.27.2_IMPLEMENTATION.md) is retained as the prior managed-ACME repair, [V0.27.1_IMPLEMENTATION.md](V0.27.1_IMPLEMENTATION.md) as the prior managed-runtime/list-sorting milestone, and older version notes remain historical evidence. The latest retained audit is [V0.25.5_AUDIT.md](V0.25.5_AUDIT.md); older audit files remain available for traceability.
 Older context documents such as [INTEGRATIONS_040](INTEGRATIONS_040.md), [MANAGEMENT](MANAGEMENT.md), [SECURITY_AUDIT](SECURITY_AUDIT.md), [ACME_RFC2136](ACME_RFC2136.md) and older version audits remain available for traceability but should not override the current functional/technical documents above.
@@ -114,12 +114,78 @@ accepted only when `administration.tls` is true. Plain remote HTTP remains avail
    "tls": true,
    "certificate_id": "admin-example",
    "allowed_hosts": ["admin.example.com"],
    "public_origin": null,
    "session_days": 30,
    "panel_compression": {"zstd": true, "br": true, "gzip": true}
  }
 }
 ```
 ### Fixed public origin for a reverse-proxied panel (0.31.4)
 For a **panel** reached through a trusted reverse proxy, set the optional
 `administration.public_origin` in **Settings → Administration** to the exact
 browser-facing HTTPS origin (for example `https://panel.example.test`).
 **Do not duplicate that hostname in `administration.allowed_hosts`.** Its DNS
 hostname is implicitly included in the runtime panel Host allowlist. **Restart
 RustProxy**; this is a restart-bound access-control setting. Omit it (`null`) for
 direct administration or when forwarded headers are canonical. This setting
 is not a wildcard, does not accept HTTP or a URL path, and requires a DNS
 hostname rather than an IP address. SQLite schema 9 remains unchanged.
 The advanced **Additional allowed DNS hostnames** field controls independent,
 extra hostnames only. Older configurations containing both values are
 accepted; on editing/saving the redundant duplicate is omitted from the
 persisted list. If `public_origin` changes or is cleared, its old hostname is
 no longer implicitly allowed (unless explicitly retained as an additional host).
 Example for the default **private loopback** administration listener behind an
 HTTPS-terminating proxy:
 ```json
 {
  "administration": {
    "allowed_hosts": [],
    "public_origin": "https://panel.example.test"
  }
 }
 ```
 The last hop must connect from loopback or an existing explicitly trusted proxy
 CIDR. If it is not loopback, configure **only the actual proxy peer CIDR** under
 Forwarding → Trusted proxies; be aware the general trusted-proxy setting also
 applies to public traffic and must never include untrusted clients. The
 administration listener should not be reachable directly from external clients.
 Do **not** grant trust to public networks to work around Origin failures.
 The pinned URL, not an element of `X-Forwarded-Proto`, defines the panel
 scheme/authority. A trusted, bounded proxy chain `https, http` (HTTPS on the
 browser side, HTTP on an internal hop) is permitted in this explicit mode.
 An `http` first hop, malformed/too-long protocol chain, duplicate/conflicting
 `X-Forwarded-Host`, different `Origin`, `Sec-Fetch-Site: cross-site`, and missing
 CSRF protection for state-changing requests still result in HTTP 403. The
 public proxy/vhost data plane is **not changed**, except that an already opted-in
 self-admin vhost can recognize the pinned hostname for its reserved panel session
 cookie; other upstreams continue to strip it. Credential-bearing certificate
 automation retains its original TLS/forwarding checks.
 Prefer fixing the proxy's forwarding headers rather than configuring the pin
 when practical. For a TLS-only public entry, the closest trusted hop should
 **replace**, not append, forwarded headers using known values, for example:
 ```nginx
 proxy_set_header Host panel.example.test;
 proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Host panel.example.test;
 proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Proto https;
 ```
 Only use that `https` setting on an entry that actually verifies external TLS;
 never trust an arbitrary inbound `X-Forwarded-Proto`. If multiple intermediate
 proxy hops must append protocol values, the pinned mode provides an explicit
 server-side comparison target without accepting a client-supplied origin as
 authoritative. Confirm deployment using a real mobile browser and the safe
 `administration origin rejected` logs before production rollout.
 **Administration → Panel content compression** (next to the admin listener/TLS settings)
 controls Zstd, Brotli and gzip for the authenticated HTML document, JavaScript,
 CSS and language bundles. Each browser request is negotiated using
@@ -1,4 +1,30 @@
-# Verification report - RustProxy 0.31.3
+# Verification report - RustProxy 0.31.4
 ## 0.31.4 reissue - origin protection and one-field administration public URL (2026-10-11)
 - **Reissue verification (2026-10-11):** rebased the complete previously prepared simplified-config source onto release identifier `0.31.4` in the manifest, existing resolved-lock snapshot package entry, OpenAPI, source/version checks, documentation and deterministic ZIP metadata. Merged the panel Origin and one-field config release notes; no backend validation logic changes were introduced during this renumbering.
 - **PASS — executed for this reissue:** `version_contracts.py`, `docs_check.py`, `langs_check.py`, `check_source.py`, `release_smoke.py`, `security_contracts.py`, `dependency_upgrade_0312.py`, `rust_module_contracts.py`, `system_info_no_subprocess_contracts.py`, `source_module_contracts.py`, `memory_contracts.py`, `web_server_contracts.py`, `admin_surface_audit_0310.py`, `security_dependency_contracts.py`; 15 standalone Node frontend/simulation scripts (including the updated original 53-case and expanded 61-case administration simulations and 9 UI scenarios); `go test ./...` for `docker-agent`; `bash -n dev.sh` and OpenAPI JSON parsing.
 - **Not executed for this reissue:** full Rust compile/test/release (`cargo` and `rustc` absent), real mobile Safari/Chrome or live reverse-proxy verification. Passing Node simulations is **not** proof of compiled Rust behavior. The inherited Cargo.lock requires verification and/or re-resolution on the declared Rust 1.99+ toolchain.
 - **Scope:** panel administration settings/config and narrow self-admin cookie opt-in only. `allowed_hosts` stores only additional DNS hostnames; the HTTPS pin contributes its hostname to the active/desired Host allowlist without persisting a duplicate.
 - **Compatibility:** older configurations with a duplicate hostname remain valid; validation canonicalizes the in-memory config and the next save omits the duplicate without an automatic SQLite migration; changing/removing the pin does not silently retain a stale implicit hostname.
 - **Security:** Host, single forwarded Host, trusted reverse proxy, first-hop HTTPS, CSRF and `Origin`/cross-site guard rules are unchanged. No SQLite schema migration, TLS listener or other vhost route changes.
 - **PASS — source/release gates:** `version_contracts.py`, `rust_module_contracts.py`, `check_source.py`, `release_smoke.py`, `docs_check.py`, `langs_check.py`, `security_contracts.py`, `admin_surface_audit_0310.py`, `security_dependency_contracts.py`, and `dependency_upgrade_0312.py`; SQLite schema-9/upgrade smoke and the source/HTML/Reader/translation checks also passed.
 - **PASS — focused simulated regressions:** `admin_public_origin_0314_config_sim.mjs`: **61/61 local Node HTTP guard-simulation assertions**, comprising 37 cases and 24 repeated session GETs. Invalid forwarded-proto on 3/12 unpinned GETs produced 403; with a pinned HTTPS public URL and **no duplicate DNS allowlist entry**, the same sequence produced 0/12. This simulation is not compiled RustProxy and cannot prove actual mobile/proxy headers.
 - **PASS — real frontend helper/UI checks:** `admin_panel_config_0314_ui_test.mjs`: **9/9 settings-normalization scenarios** plus form/HTML/locale/OpenAPI consistency; `panel_cache_http_0310_ui_test.mjs` also executes the updated real administration form callback with a duplicated legacy hostname and verifies it is omitted on save.
 - **PASS — other standalone checks:** all 14 bundled Node UI/simulation scripts, memory model (300,000 simulated PURGEs), 2,000 HTTP requests to a **Python mock peer** (not RustProxy), and `cd docker-agent && go test ./...`.
 - **Harness and compiler limitations:** an initial `./dev.sh test` run exposed a legacy UI-test harness that lacked the new form helper; the harness was corrected and passed separately. A subsequent monolithic run exceeded the execution time limit after the memory/load-model stage, so no complete `./dev.sh test` success is claimed. `./dev.sh check` exited **127** because `cargo`/`rustc` are not installed. New Rust tests in `src/settings/tests.rs` and `src/admin/tests/part_11.rs` were **not compiled/executed**. The inherited Cargo.lock still needs resolution on Rust 1.99+; live mobile and real reverse-proxy acceptance remain OPEN.
 ### Earlier 0.31.4 validation baseline (2026-10-11)
 - **User scope:** admin panel only; public vhosts, proxy forwarding, streams and database migrations are unchanged. The 0.31.3 BFCache/session resume and visible retry protections are retained.
 - **Source correction:** optional `administration.public_origin` pins a browser-facing HTTPS panel origin to a configured DNS allowlist; it takes effect after restart and only with a trusted last-hop proxy. It accepts bounded `X-Forwarded-Proto: https, http` without relying on an ambiguous forwarded-proto element for the expected origin. Without the pin, 0.31.3's strict handling remains.
 - **Security:** actual Host is validated, forwarded Host must be single/matching, the protocol's first hop must be HTTPS, and Origin, cross-site and CSRF checks remain. Untrusted peers and credential-bearing certificate automation retain their previous scheme validation. The earlier build required explicit `allowed_hosts`; the reissue now derives the pinned hostname without wildcard trust.
 - **Node HTTP guard simulation (not compiled RustProxy): PASS, 53/53 assertions**, including 29 individual scenarios and 24 repeated session GETs: without the pin and with intentionally malformed XFP every fourth request, **3/12 GETs returned 403**; with an explicit pin and otherwise identical simulated headers, **0/12 returned 403**. `tools/checks/admin_public_origin_0314_sim.mjs` checks relevant code anchors and operates a local Node HTTP test peer. This does not confirm production headers or backend runtime behavior.
 - **PASS (2026-10-11):** `./dev.sh test` passed every available Rust-independent stage: source-module boundaries, version/contracts, SQLite schema-9 migrations and upgrade, security source/dependency checks, 300,000 PURGE-model iterations, 2,000 real HTTP requests to a **Python test peer**, all bundled Node/browser UI regressions (including BFCache/resume), 0.31.4 HTTP simulation, documentation and both language packs. Exit **127** at the missing Rust/Cargo toolchain guard only. The simulated peer is **not** a running RustProxy binary. `./dev.sh check` likewise exits 127 due to missing Cargo.
 - **PASS:** `(cd docker-agent && go test ./...)`, `node --check tools/checks/admin_public_origin_0314_sim.mjs`; source-package size/integrity checks are performed separately.
 - **Rust regression tests added, NOT EXECUTED:** `src/settings/tests.rs` and `src/admin/tests/part_11.rs` cover pin validation, restart, strict opt-out, session Secure cookie, CSRF, foreign Origin, cross-site, host spoofing and untrusted peers.
 - **Remaining release gate OPEN:** the sandbox has no Rust/Cargo/rustfmt and the inherited lockfile remains unresolved against 0.31.2+ dependencies. Before production use: resolve on Rust 1.99+, format, clippy, test/build, then capture actual mobile Safari/Chrome and reverse-proxy traffic and run the acceptance matrix in [IMPLEMENTATION_0.31.4.md](IMPLEMENTATION_0.31.4.md). No claim is made that the original field `auth.invalid_origin` was directly observed or eliminated.
 ## 0.31.3 - invalid-Origin resume and mobile panel recovery (2026-10-11)
@@ -893,7 +893,7 @@
    "administrationCertificate": "Certificate",
    "administrationGeneratedCertificate": "Application-generated default certificate",
    "administrationHelp": "HTTPS allows the administration listener to bind beyond loopback. Plain HTTP on the HTTPS port is redirected automatically. Listener and certificate changes take effect after restart.",
-    "administrationHosts": "Allowed DNS hostnames (optional strict allowlist)",
+    "administrationHosts": "Additional allowed DNS hostnames",
    "administrationHttps": "Enable HTTPS for administration",
    "administrationListen": "Listen address",
    "cacheOverhead": "Overhead",
@@ -2332,6 +2332,10 @@
    "cacheHttpInvalidationCurlNote": "PURGE removes an exact URL; BAN invalidates a path prefix for 1 hour. No admin cookie is needed, but your IP must be allowed. A reverse proxy must forward these methods and trusted client IP information.",
    "cacheHttpInvalidationTitle": "HTTP BAN / PURGE allowlist",
    "cacheHttpInvalidationAddresses": "Permitted client IP addresses / CIDRs (one per line)",
-    "cacheHttpInvalidationHelp": "Empty = disabled. PURGE /path?query removes exact matches; BAN /path prevents use of cached URLs with that prefix (default TTL 1 hour, optional X-RustProxy-Ban-Ttl). BAN / requires X-RustProxy-Confirm-Wide: 1. Only the matched Host and vhost are affected. Behind a reverse proxy, configure trusted proxies and sanitize forwarding headers."
+    "cacheHttpInvalidationHelp": "Empty = disabled. PURGE /path?query removes exact matches; BAN /path prevents use of cached URLs with that prefix (default TTL 1 hour, optional X-RustProxy-Ban-Ttl). BAN / requires X-RustProxy-Confirm-Wide: 1. Only the matched Host and vhost are affected. Behind a reverse proxy, configure trusted proxies and sanitize forwarding headers.",
    "administrationPublicOrigin": "Public panel HTTPS origin (optional)",
    "administrationHostsAdvanced": "Advanced: additional allowed DNS hostnames",
    "administrationHostsHelp": "Enter only additional hostnames. The public panel URL is included automatically. Without that URL, this remains an independent strict allowlist.",
    "administrationPublicOriginHelp": "Behind a trusted reverse proxy, enter the external HTTPS panel URL once. Its hostname is automatically allowed. Restart required; public proxy routing is unchanged."
  }
 }
@@ -893,7 +893,7 @@
    "administrationCertificate": "Certyfikat",
    "administrationGeneratedCertificate": "Domyślny certyfikat wygenerowany przez aplikację",
    "administrationHelp": "HTTPS pozwala wystawić panel administracyjny poza loopback. Zwykły HTTP na porcie HTTPS jest automatycznie przekierowywany. Zmiany listenera i certyfikatu działają po restarcie.",
-    "administrationHosts": "Dozwolone hosty DNS (opcjonalna ścisła lista)",
+    "administrationHosts": "Dodatkowe dozwolone hosty DNS",
    "administrationHttps": "Włącz HTTPS dla panelu administracyjnego",
    "administrationListen": "Adres nasłuchu",
    "cacheOverhead": "Narzut",
@@ -2332,6 +2332,10 @@
    "cacheHttpInvalidationCurlNote": "PURGE usuwa dokładny URL; BAN unieważnia prefiks ścieżki na 1 godzinę. Nie potrzeba ciasteczka administratora, lecz IP musi być na liście. Reverse proxy musi przekazywać te metody oraz poprawnie ustalone IP klienta.",
    "cacheHttpInvalidationTitle": "Lista dozwolonych adresów HTTP BAN / PURGE",
    "cacheHttpInvalidationAddresses": "Dozwolone adresy IP klientów / CIDR (jeden na wiersz)",
-    "cacheHttpInvalidationHelp": "Pusta lista = wyłączone. PURGE /ścieżka?zapytanie usuwa dokładne trafienia; BAN /ścieżka blokuje buforowane adresy URL z tym prefiksem (domyślnie 1 godzina, opcjonalnie X-RustProxy-Ban-Ttl). BAN / wymaga X-RustProxy-Confirm-Wide: 1. Operacje dotyczą wyłącznie dopasowanego hosta i vhosta. Za reverse proxy skonfiguruj zaufane proxy i usuwanie fałszywych nagłówków przekazywania."
+    "cacheHttpInvalidationHelp": "Pusta lista = wyłączone. PURGE /ścieżka?zapytanie usuwa dokładne trafienia; BAN /ścieżka blokuje buforowane adresy URL z tym prefiksem (domyślnie 1 godzina, opcjonalnie X-RustProxy-Ban-Ttl). BAN / wymaga X-RustProxy-Confirm-Wide: 1. Operacje dotyczą wyłącznie dopasowanego hosta i vhosta. Za reverse proxy skonfiguruj zaufane proxy i usuwanie fałszywych nagłówków przekazywania.",
    "administrationPublicOrigin": "Publiczny adres HTTPS panelu (opcjonalnie)",
    "administrationHostsAdvanced": "Zaawansowane: dodatkowe dozwolone hosty DNS",
    "administrationHostsHelp": "Wpisz wyłącznie dodatkowe domeny. Domena z publicznego adresu panelu jest dozwolona automatycznie. Bez tego adresu lista pozostaje niezależnym ścisłym ograniczeniem.",
    "administrationPublicOriginHelp": "Za zaufanym reverse proxy wpisz tylko publiczny adres HTTPS panelu. Jego domena zostanie dozwolona automatycznie. Wymagany restart; ruch proxy bez zmian."
  }
 }
@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@ if ! command -v cargo >/dev/null 2>&1 || ! command -v rustc >/dev/null 2>&1; the
    exit 127
 fi
 python3 tools/checks/preflight.py
-if [[ "$(python3 scripts/version.py)" != '0.31.3' ]]; then
+if [[ "$(python3 scripts/version.py)" != '0.31.4' ]]; then
-    printf 'Expected RustProxy 0.31.3 sources.\n' >&2
+    printf 'Expected RustProxy 0.31.4 sources.\n' >&2
    exit 1
 fi
 printf 'Toolchain: '; rustc --version
@@ -229,6 +229,72 @@ fn external_admin_authority(
    }
 }
 // In pinned-origin mode accept only bounded, consistent proxy-hop metadata:
 // the first hop must report browser HTTPS, later internal hops may use HTTP.
 // We still do NOT pick a trusted scheme from these values; the explicit pin
 // defines the panel origin. A clear public HTTP or unknown value fails closed.
 fn pinned_admin_proto_compatible(headers: &HeaderMap) -> bool {
    let mut hops = 0;
    for value in headers.get_all("x-forwarded-proto").iter() {
        let Ok(value) = value.to_str() else { return false; };
        for part in value.split(',') {
            hops += 1;
            if hops > 8 { return false; }
            let scheme = part.trim();
            if (hops == 1 && scheme != "https")
                || !matches!(scheme, "http" | "https")
            {
                return false;
            }
        }
    }
    true
 }
 /// A configured panel URL is authoritative only for an explicitly trusted
 /// direct reverse-proxy peer. In this mode X-Forwarded-Proto is deliberately
 /// ignored: conflicting hop values such as "https, http" are not evidence of
 /// the browser scheme. The public URL comes from administrator configuration,
 /// not from a user-controlled header.
 fn configured_admin_public_authority(
    state: &App,
    headers: &HeaderMap,
    peer: Option<PeerAddr>,
    raw_host: &str,
    transport: Transport,
 ) -> Result<Option<String>, ()> {
    let Some(origin) = state.active_administration.public_origin.as_deref() else {
        return Ok(None);
    };
    if !trusted_admin_proxy(state, peer) {
        // Never apply the pin to arbitrary direct/untrusted connections.
        return Ok(None);
    }
    if !admin_host_allowed(
        raw_host,
        state.policy.admin_addr,
        transport.tls,
        &state.active_administration.allowed_hosts,
    ) {
        return Err(());
    }
    let authority = origin.strip_prefix("https://").ok_or(())?;
    if !pinned_admin_proto_compatible(headers) {
        return Err(());
    }
    if headers.contains_key("x-forwarded-host") {
        let forwarded = single_header(headers, "x-forwarded-host").ok_or(())?;
        if forwarded.contains('@') {
            return Err(());
        }
        let candidate = forwarded.parse::<http::uri::Authority>().map_err(|_| ())?;
        if !authority_matches_origin(&candidate, authority, "https") {
            return Err(());
        }
    }
    Ok(Some(authority.to_owned()))
 }
 fn external_admin_scheme(
    state: &App,
    headers: &HeaderMap,
@@ -244,6 +244,7 @@ pub(super) static READER_DOCUMENTS: &[(&str, &str, &str)] = &[
        "guides",
        include_str!(concat!(env!("CARGO_MANIFEST_DIR"), "/docs/STREAMS.md")),
    ),
    reader_doc!("docs/IMPLEMENTATION_0.31.4.md", "technical"),
    reader_doc!("docs/IMPLEMENTATION_0.31.3.md", "technical"),
    reader_doc!("docs/IMPLEMENTATION_0.31.1.md", "technical"),
    reader_doc!("docs/IMPLEMENTATION_0.31.0.md", "technical"),
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
  "openapi": "3.0.3",
  "info": {
    "title": "RustProxy Administration API",
-    "version": "0.31.3",
+    "version": "0.31.4",
    "description": "Administration API for the active panel origin. Sign in through the panel; the same-origin HttpOnly cookie authenticates all private operations. Mutations also require the exact Origin, X-RustProxy-Request: 1 and a session-bound X-CSRF-Token. Loopback HTTP is the default; Settings can enable HTTPS before using a non-loopback administration bind. This document contains no live configuration or credentials. Object schemas marked extensible are summaries: full configuration validation is authoritative in Rust."
  },
  "servers": [
@@ -764,7 +764,13 @@
                "type": "array",
                "items": {
                  "type": "string"
-                }
+                },
                "description": "Optional additional panel DNS hostnames. The hostname of public_origin is implicitly allowed and must not be duplicated."
              },
              "public_origin": {
                "type": "string",
                "nullable": true,
                "description": "Optional administrator-pinned browser HTTPS origin behind a trusted reverse proxy. Its DNS hostname is automatically allowed without adding it to allowed_hosts. Restart required. Does not affect public proxy traffic."
              },
              "session_days": {
                "type": "integer",
@@ -117,17 +117,39 @@ async fn guard(State(state): State<Arc<App>>, mut request: Request, next: Next)
    let headers = request.headers();
    let trusted_host = trusted_admin_proxy(&state, peer);
    let trusted_proto = trusted_admin_forwarded_proto(&state, peer);
-    let scheme = match external_admin_scheme(&state, headers, peer, transport) {
+    // Pinned browser origin is panel-only. Certificate automation using API
-        Ok(value) => value,
+    // credentials keeps the original forwarding/TLS authorization semantics.
-        Err(()) => {
+    let automation_credentials = headers.contains_key(CERTIFICATE_API_KEY_HEADER)
-            return invalid_admin_origin(&request, "external_scheme", None, None, trusted_host, trusted_proto);
+        || (headers.contains_key(AUTHORIZATION)
-        }
+            && certificate_api_operation(request.method(), request.uri().path()).is_some());
    let pinned_authority_result = if automation_credentials {
        Ok(None)
    } else {
        configured_admin_public_authority(&state, headers, peer, &raw_host, transport)
    };
-    let external_authority =
+    let pinned_authority = match pinned_authority_result {
-        match external_admin_authority(&state, headers, peer, &raw_host, scheme == "https") {
+        Ok(value) => value,
        Err(()) => return invalid_admin_origin(&request, "pinned_origin_mismatch", Some("https"),
            state.active_administration.public_origin.as_deref().and_then(|value| value.strip_prefix("https://")),
            trusted_host, trusted_proto),
    };
    let (scheme, external_authority) = if let Some(authority) = pinned_authority {
        // HTTPS is a trusted, administrator-pinned identity here. Do not select
        // any list element of an ambiguous forwarded-proto chain.
        ("https", authority)
    } else {
        let scheme = match external_admin_scheme(&state, headers, peer, transport) {
            Ok(value) => value,
            Err(()) => {
                return invalid_admin_origin(&request, "external_scheme", None, None, trusted_host, trusted_proto);
            }
        };
        let authority = match external_admin_authority(&state, headers, peer, &raw_host, scheme == "https") {
            Ok(value) => value,
            Err(()) => return secure(reject(StatusCode::FORBIDDEN, "auth.invalid_host")),
        };
        (scheme, authority)
    };
    if headers.get_all(ORIGIN).iter().count() > 1
        || headers.get(ORIGIN).is_some_and(|h| {
            h.to_str()
@@ -123,10 +123,11 @@ fn status_payload(state: &App) -> Value {
            desired_admin
                .allowed_hosts
                .extend(certificate.hosts.clone());
            desired_admin.allowed_hosts.sort();
            desired_admin.allowed_hosts.dedup();
        }
    }
    desired_admin.include_public_origin_host();
    desired_admin.allowed_hosts.sort();
    desired_admin.allowed_hosts.dedup();
    let desired_admin_certificate_files = desired_admin
        .certificate_id
        .as_deref()
@@ -9,4 +9,5 @@ mod tests {
    include!("tests/part_08.rs");
    include!("tests/part_09.rs");
    include!("tests/part_10.rs");
    include!("tests/part_11.rs");
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,142 @@
    #[test]
    fn pinned_admin_proxy_proto_is_bounded_and_requires_external_https() {
        let mut headers = HeaderMap::new();
        assert!(pinned_admin_proto_compatible(&headers));
        headers.insert("x-forwarded-proto", HeaderValue::from_static("https"));
        assert!(pinned_admin_proto_compatible(&headers));
        headers.insert("x-forwarded-proto", HeaderValue::from_static("https, http"));
        assert!(pinned_admin_proto_compatible(&headers));
        headers.append("x-forwarded-proto", HeaderValue::from_static("http"));
        assert!(pinned_admin_proto_compatible(&headers));
        for bad in ["http", "http, https", "https, ftp", "https,", ",https", "HTTPS", "https, http, http, http, http, http, http, http, http"] {
            headers.remove("x-forwarded-proto");
            headers.insert("x-forwarded-proto", HeaderValue::from_str(bad).unwrap());
            assert!(!pinned_admin_proto_compatible(&headers), "must reject {bad}");
        }
    }
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn pinned_panel_origin_survives_multi_hop_proxy_without_relaxing_csrf() {
        let mut config = Config::default();
        config.administration.public_origin = Some("https://panel.example.test".into());
        let (router, store, _dir, secret, csrf) = fixture_with_config(config).await;
        let cookie = format!("{}={secret}", auth::COOKIE_NAME);
        // Without an explicit origin pin, 0.31.3 rejected this session GET as
        // external_scheme although the browser address remained correct.
        let result = router.clone().oneshot(request("/api/auth/session")
            .header("cookie", &cookie)
            .header("x-forwarded-host", "panel.example.test")
            .header("x-forwarded-proto", "https, http")
            .header("sec-fetch-site", "same-origin")
            .extension(PeerAddr("127.0.0.1:45000".parse().unwrap()))
            .body(Body::empty()).unwrap()).await.unwrap();
        assert_eq!(result.status(), StatusCode::OK);
        let session_cookie = result.headers().get_all(SET_COOKIE).iter()
            .filter_map(|v| v.to_str().ok()).find(|v| v.starts_with(auth::COOKIE_NAME)).unwrap();
        assert!(session_cookie.contains("; Secure"));
        // The incoming admin Host may itself be the pinned public DNS name.
        // There is no separate allowed_hosts entry in the saved configuration.
        let pinned_host = Request::builder().uri("/api/auth/session")
            .header("host", "panel.example.test")
            .header("cookie", &cookie)
            .header("x-forwarded-host", "panel.example.test")
            .header("x-forwarded-proto", "https, http")
            .extension(PeerAddr("127.0.0.1:45003".parse().unwrap()))
            .body(Body::empty()).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(router.clone().oneshot(pinned_host).await.unwrap().status(), StatusCode::OK);
        // Explicit Origin, CSRF token and app request marker remain mandatory
        // for a state-changing request even when XFP contains multiple hops.
        let unauthorized = router.clone().oneshot(request("/api/auth/logout")
            .method("POST").header("cookie", &cookie)
            .header("origin", "https://panel.example.test")
            .header("x-forwarded-host", "panel.example.test")
            .header("x-forwarded-proto", "https, http")
            .extension(PeerAddr("127.0.0.1:45001".parse().unwrap()))
            .body(Body::empty()).unwrap()).await.unwrap();
        assert_eq!(unauthorized.status(), StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
        let authorized = router.oneshot(request("/api/auth/logout")
            .method("POST").header("cookie", &cookie)
            .header("origin", "https://panel.example.test")
            .header("x-rustproxy-request", "1")
            .header("x-csrf-token", csrf)
            .header("x-forwarded-host", "panel.example.test")
            .header("x-forwarded-proto", "https, http")
            .extension(PeerAddr("127.0.0.1:45002".parse().unwrap()))
            .body(Body::empty()).unwrap()).await.unwrap();
        assert_eq!(authorized.status(), StatusCode::OK);
        store.close().await;
    }
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn pinned_panel_origin_rejects_untrusted_proxy_host_and_origin() {
        let mut config = Config::default();
        config.administration.public_origin = Some("https://panel.example.test".into());
        let (router, store, _dir, secret, _) = fixture_with_config(config).await;
        let cookie = format!("{}={secret}", auth::COOKIE_NAME);
        for (xfh, xfp, origin, fetch_site) in [
            ("evil.example.test", "https, http", "https://panel.example.test", "same-origin"),
            ("other@panel.example.test", "https, http", "https://panel.example.test", "same-origin"),
            ("panel.example.test", "http", "https://panel.example.test", "same-origin"),
            ("panel.example.test", "http, https", "https://panel.example.test", "same-origin"),
            ("panel.example.test", "https, http", "https://evil.example.test", "same-origin"),
            ("panel.example.test", "https, http", "null", "same-origin"),
            ("panel.example.test", "https, http", "https://panel.example.test", "cross-site"),
        ] {
            let result = router.clone().oneshot(request("/api/auth/session")
                .header("cookie", &cookie)
                .header("x-forwarded-host", xfh)
                .header("x-forwarded-proto", xfp)
                .header("origin", origin)
                .header("sec-fetch-site", fetch_site)
                .extension(PeerAddr("127.0.0.1:45000".parse().unwrap()))
                .body(Body::empty()).unwrap()).await.unwrap();
            assert_eq!(result.status(), StatusCode::FORBIDDEN,
                "must reject forwarded-host={xfh}, proto={xfp}, origin={origin}, fetch={fetch_site}");
        }
        // Credential-bearing certificate automation does not inherit the
        // browser-origin override, even through the same trusted admin socket.
        let automation = router.clone().oneshot(request("/api/certificates/deploy")
            .method("POST")
            .header(CERTIFICATE_API_KEY_HEADER, "svc-key")
            .header("x-forwarded-host", "panel.example.test")
            .header("x-forwarded-proto", "https, http")
            .extension(PeerAddr("127.0.0.1:45000".parse().unwrap()))
            .body(Body::empty()).unwrap()).await.unwrap();
        assert_eq!(automation.status(), StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
        let untrusted = router.clone().oneshot(request("/api/auth/session")
            .header("cookie", &cookie)
            .header("x-forwarded-host", "panel.example.test")
            .header("x-forwarded-proto", "https, http")
            .header("origin", "https://panel.example.test")
            .extension(PeerAddr("192.0.2.42:44000".parse().unwrap()))
            .body(Body::empty()).unwrap()).await.unwrap();
        assert_eq!(untrusted.status(), StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
        let mut duplicated = request("/api/auth/session")
            .header("cookie", &cookie)
            .header("x-forwarded-host", "panel.example.test")
            .header("x-forwarded-proto", "https, http")
            .extension(PeerAddr("127.0.0.1:45000".parse().unwrap()))
            .body(Body::empty()).unwrap();
        duplicated.headers_mut().append("x-forwarded-host", "panel.example.test".parse().unwrap());
        assert_eq!(router.clone().oneshot(duplicated).await.unwrap().status(), StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
        store.close().await;
    }
    #[tokio::test]
    async fn without_public_origin_ambiguous_forwarded_proto_stays_forbidden() {
        let mut config = Config::default();
        config.administration.allowed_hosts = vec!["panel.example.test".into()];
        let (router, store, _dir, secret, _) = fixture_with_config(config).await;
        let result = router.oneshot(request("/api/auth/session")
            .header("cookie", format!("{}={secret}", auth::COOKIE_NAME))
            .header("x-forwarded-host", "panel.example.test")
            .header("x-forwarded-proto", "https, http")
            .extension(PeerAddr("127.0.0.1:45000".parse().unwrap()))
            .body(Body::empty()).unwrap()).await.unwrap();
        assert_eq!(result.status(), StatusCode::FORBIDDEN);
        store.close().await;
    }
@@ -2734,9 +2734,17 @@
                                        data-i18n="administrationHttps">Enable HTTPS for administration</span></label>
                                <label><span data-i18n="administrationCertificate">Certificate</span><select
                                        id="admin-certificate"></select></label>
-                                <label><span data-i18n="administrationHosts">Allowed DNS hostnames</span><textarea
+                                <label><span data-i18n="administrationPublicOrigin">Public panel HTTPS origin (optional)</span><input
-                                        id="admin-hosts" rows="4" spellcheck="false"
+                                        id="admin-public-origin" maxlength="255" placeholder="https://panel.example.com"
-                                        placeholder="admin.example.com"></textarea></label>
+                                        type="url" spellcheck="false" autocomplete="off" /></label>
                                <p class="fine" data-i18n="administrationPublicOriginHelp">When behind a trusted reverse proxy, enter the panel's external HTTPS address once. Its DNS name is automatically allowed. A restart is required.</p>
                                <details id="admin-extra-hosts-details">
                                    <summary data-i18n="administrationHostsAdvanced">Advanced: additional allowed DNS hostnames</summary>
                                    <label><span data-i18n="administrationHosts">Additional allowed DNS hostnames</span><textarea
                                            id="admin-hosts" rows="4" spellcheck="false"
                                            placeholder="other-admin.example.com"></textarea></label>
                                    <p class="fine" data-i18n="administrationHostsHelp">Only extra hostnames belong here. The hostname from the public panel URL is automatically included; without a public URL this remains an independent strict allowlist.</p>
                                </details>
                                <label><span data-i18n="administrationSessionDays">Administrator session lifetime
                                        (days)</span><input id="admin-session-days" min="7" max="30" step="1"
                                        type="number" required="" /></label>
@@ -8,6 +8,19 @@
    ? "logging"
    : (typeof location !== "undefined" && location.pathname === "/settings" ? new URLSearchParams(location.search).get("tab") : null);
  const tabAliases = { http2: "connections" };
  // Keep the public panel hostname implicit. Legacy configurations may have
  // written it into allowed_hosts in 0.31.4; do not show/save it twice.
  function pinnedAdminHostname(value) {
    try {
      const url = new URL(value);
      return url.protocol === "https:" ? url.hostname.toLowerCase().replace(/\.$/, "") : "";
    } catch { return ""; }
  }
  function additionalAdminHosts(hosts, origin) {
    const pinned = pinnedAdminHostname(origin);
    return hosts.map(host => host.trim()).filter(host =>
      host && (!pinned || host.replace(/\.$/, "").toLowerCase() !== pinned));
  }
  const normalizedRequestedTab = tabAliases[requestedTab] || requestedTab;
  let active = buttons.some(button => button.dataset.settingsTab === normalizedRequestedTab) ? normalizedRequestedTab : defaultTab;
  function applySettingsSearch() {
@@ -212,7 +225,10 @@ curl --fail --show-error --request POST \
      $("admin-tls").checked = !!admin.tls;
      const current = admin.certificate_id || "", generated = document.createElement("option"); generated.value = ""; generated.textContent = t("administrationGeneratedCertificate");
      $("admin-certificate").replaceChildren(generated, ...(envelope.config.tls?.certificates || []).map(cert => { const o = document.createElement("option"); o.value = cert.id; o.textContent = cert.id; return o; })); $("admin-certificate").value = current;
-      $("admin-hosts").value = (admin.allowed_hosts || []).join("\n");
+      const extraHosts = additionalAdminHosts(admin.allowed_hosts || [], admin.public_origin);
      $("admin-hosts").value = extraHosts.join("\n");
      $("admin-extra-hosts-details").open = extraHosts.length > 0;
      $("admin-public-origin").value = admin.public_origin || "";
      $("admin-session-days").value = Number(admin.session_days || 30);
      for (const codec of ["zstd", "br", "gzip"]) $(`admin-compression-${codec}`).checked = admin.panel_compression?.[codec] !== false;
    }
@@ -300,7 +316,7 @@ curl --fail --show-error --request POST \
  }, "prometheus");
  bindSettingsForm("administration-form", next => {
    const locked = !!latestStatus?.administration?.listen_locked;
-    next.administration = { listen: locked ? null : $("admin-listen").value.trim(), tls: $("admin-tls").checked, certificate_id: $("admin-tls").checked ? ($("admin-certificate").value || null) : null, allowed_hosts: $("admin-hosts").value.split(/[\n,]+/).map(v => v.trim()).filter(Boolean), session_days: Number($("admin-session-days").value), panel_compression: Object.fromEntries(["zstd", "br", "gzip"].map(codec => [codec, $(`admin-compression-${codec}`).checked])) };
+    next.administration = { listen: locked ? null : $("admin-listen").value.trim(), tls: $("admin-tls").checked, certificate_id: $("admin-tls").checked ? ($("admin-certificate").value || null) : null, allowed_hosts: additionalAdminHosts($("admin-hosts").value.split(/[\n,]+/), $("admin-public-origin").value.trim()), public_origin: $("admin-public-origin").value.trim() || null, session_days: Number($("admin-session-days").value), panel_compression: Object.fromEntries(["zstd", "br", "gzip"].map(codec => [codec, $(`admin-compression-${codec}`).checked])) };
  }, "administration");
  bindSettingsForm("tls-policy-form", next => {
    if (!$("tls-policy-12").checked && !$("tls-policy-13").checked) throw fieldError($("tls-policy-12"), t("tlsPolicyVersionRequired"));
@@ -181,8 +181,9 @@ fn response_context(
 }
 /// Reserved administration-session cookies may cross the proxy boundary only
-/// for the explicit self-admin deployment: HTTPS, an explicitly allowed public
+/// for the explicit self-admin deployment: HTTPS, a specifically allowed
-/// administration hostname, a backend that directly targets the configured
+/// administration hostname (extra DNS list or pinned public HTTPS origin),
 /// a backend that directly targets the configured
 /// administration listener, and the existing local-listener risk opt-in.
 fn admin_session_passthrough(
    snapshot: &crate::config::Snapshot,
@@ -196,9 +197,7 @@ fn admin_session_passthrough(
            .envelope
            .config
            .administration
-            .allowed_hosts
+            .explicitly_allowed_panel_host(host)
            .iter()
            .any(|allowed| allowed.eq_ignore_ascii_case(host))
 }
 fn apply_response_rules(
@@ -145,10 +145,11 @@ impl App {
                active_administration
                    .allowed_hosts
                    .extend(certificate.hosts.clone());
                active_administration.allowed_hosts.sort();
                active_administration.allowed_hosts.dedup();
            }
        }
        active_administration.include_public_origin_host();
        active_administration.allowed_hosts.sort();
        active_administration.allowed_hosts.dedup();
        let logs = Logs::start(log_settings, shutdown.clone());
        let traffic = crate::traffic::Analytics::start(shutdown.clone());
        let app = Arc::new(Self {
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 //! Persisted listener intent and response controls. Listener changes require restart.
-use anyhow::{ensure, Result};
+use anyhow::{ensure, Context as _, Result};
 use http::{HeaderMap, HeaderValue};
 use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
 use std::{net::SocketAddr, time::Duration};
@@ -195,8 +195,13 @@ pub struct Administration {
    pub tls: bool,
    /// None uses the application-managed default certificate pair.
    pub certificate_id: Option<String>,
-    /// Optional strict DNS Host/Origin allowlist. Empty HTTPS lists accept valid DNS names.
+    /// Optional additional DNS Host allowlist. The hostname of public_origin is
    /// included automatically at runtime, never duplicated in persisted config.
    /// With no public_origin, an empty HTTPS list retains the legacy DNS policy.
    pub allowed_hosts: Vec<String>,
    /// Optional fixed browser-facing HTTPS origin for the panel behind a trusted
    /// reverse proxy. It is NEVER inferred from forwarded headers.
    pub public_origin: Option<String>,
    /// Absolute browser-session lifetime. Existing sessions are bounded by the current value.
    pub session_days: u16,
    pub panel_compression: PanelCompression,
@@ -208,6 +213,7 @@ impl Default for Administration {
            tls: false,
            certificate_id: None,
            allowed_hosts: Vec::new(),
            public_origin: None,
            session_days: 30,
            panel_compression: PanelCompression::default(),
        }
@@ -225,6 +231,7 @@ impl Administration {
            || self.tls != active.tls
            || self.certificate_id != active.certificate_id
            || self.allowed_hosts != active.allowed_hosts
            || self.public_origin != active.public_origin
    }
    pub fn validate(&mut self, tls: &crate::tls::Settings) -> Result<()> {
        if let Some(addr) = self.listen {
@@ -263,6 +270,14 @@ impl Administration {
                "duplicate administration hostname"
            );
        }
        if let Some(public_origin) = self.public_origin.as_mut() {
            *public_origin = normalize_public_admin_origin(public_origin)?;
        }
        // Accept old 0.31.4 saved configs, but never retain a second explicit
        // copy of the pinned hostname in a validated or newly saved config.
        if let Some(host) = self.public_origin_host().map(str::to_owned) {
            self.allowed_hosts.retain(|allowed| !allowed.eq_ignore_ascii_case(&host));
        }
        Ok(())
    }
 }
@@ -467,5 +482,6 @@ impl ServerHeader {
        }
    }
 }
 include!("settings/public_origin.rs");
 #[cfg(test)]
 include!("settings/tests.rs");
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
 // Normalize the browser-facing HTTPS origin independently of the optional
 // additional DNS allowlist. It is never inferred from forwarding headers.
 fn normalize_public_admin_origin(public_origin: &str) -> Result<String> {
    ensure!(
        public_origin.len() <= 255 && !public_origin.chars().any(|c| matches!(c, '@' | '#' | '?' | ',' | '\\')),
        "administration public_origin must be a single HTTPS origin without userinfo, query or fragment"
    );
    let uri = public_origin.parse::<http::Uri>()
        .context("invalid administration public_origin")?;
    ensure!(
        uri.scheme_str() == Some("https")
            && uri.query().is_none()
            && matches!(uri.path(), "" | "/"),
        "administration public_origin must be HTTPS without a path or query"
    );
    let authority = uri.authority()
        .context("administration public_origin requires an authority")?;
    // This setting is for a named HTTPS origin. Use the existing direct
    // listener/Host policy for IP addresses and localhost.
    let host = crate::config::normalize_host(authority.host())?;
    ensure!(
        host.parse::<std::net::IpAddr>().is_err() && host != "localhost",
        "administration public_origin must name a DNS hostname"
    );
    let port = if authority.as_str().contains(':') {
        let port = authority.port_u16()
            .context("invalid administration public_origin port")?;
        ensure!(port > 0, "administration public_origin port must be nonzero");
        format!(":{port}")
    } else {
        String::new()
    };
    Ok(format!("https://{host}{port}"))
 }
 impl Administration {
    /// The origin is validated and normalized before it is stored, so this
    /// returns only its DNS hostname (never a forwarded or client-supplied host).
    pub fn public_origin_host(&self) -> Option<&str> {
        self.public_origin.as_deref()
            .and_then(|url| url.strip_prefix("https://"))
            .and_then(|authority| authority.split(':').next())
    }
    /// Used only by the explicitly opted-in panel session-cookie passthrough.
    pub fn explicitly_allowed_panel_host(&self, host: &str) -> bool {
        self.allowed_hosts.iter().any(|allowed| allowed.eq_ignore_ascii_case(host))
            || self.public_origin_host().is_some_and(|name| name.eq_ignore_ascii_case(host))
    }
    /// Build the access-control allowlist for the active/desired panel state.
    /// Never mutate the saved configuration or accumulate stale hosts on edits.
    pub fn include_public_origin_host(&mut self) {
        if let Some(host) = self.public_origin_host().map(str::to_owned) {
            if !self.allowed_hosts.iter().any(|allowed| allowed.eq_ignore_ascii_case(&host)) {
                self.allowed_hosts.push(host);
            }
        }
    }
 }
@@ -256,6 +256,67 @@ mod tests {
        admin.allowed_hosts = vec!["panel.example.com".into(), "PANEL.EXAMPLE.COM.".into()];
        assert!(admin.validate(&crate::tls::Settings::default()).is_err());
    }
    #[test]
    fn administration_public_origin_is_https_explicit_and_restart_bound() {
        let tls = crate::tls::Settings::default();
        let mut admin = Administration {
            public_origin: Some("https://Panel.Example.TEST:8443/".into()),
            ..Administration::default()
        };
        admin.validate(&tls).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(admin.public_origin.as_deref(), Some("https://panel.example.test:8443"));
        assert_eq!(admin.public_origin_host(), Some("panel.example.test"));
        assert!(admin.allowed_hosts.is_empty(), "pin must not be stored twice");
        assert!(admin.explicitly_allowed_panel_host("PANEL.EXAMPLE.TEST"));
        assert!(!admin.explicitly_allowed_panel_host("other.example.test"));
        let mut runtime = admin.clone();
        runtime.include_public_origin_host();
        runtime.include_public_origin_host();
        assert_eq!(runtime.allowed_hosts, vec!["panel.example.test".to_owned()]);
        assert!(admin.allowed_hosts.is_empty(), "saved config remains unchanged");
        let active = Administration { public_origin: None, ..admin.clone() };
        assert!(admin.restart_differs(&active));
        let mut legacy: Administration = serde_json::from_str(r#"{"allowed_hosts":["panel.example.test"]}"#).unwrap();
        legacy.validate(&tls).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(legacy.public_origin, None);
        assert!(legacy.explicitly_allowed_panel_host("panel.example.test"));
        let mut old_pin: Administration = serde_json::from_str(
            r#"{"public_origin":"https://panel.example.test","allowed_hosts":["PANEL.Example.TEST.","other.example.test"]}"#
        ).unwrap();
        old_pin.validate(&tls).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(old_pin.allowed_hosts, vec!["other.example.test".to_owned()]);
        assert!(old_pin.explicitly_allowed_panel_host("panel.example.test"));
        assert!(old_pin.explicitly_allowed_panel_host("other.example.test"));
        // Additional hosts are independent: editing/removing the pinned origin
        // must not leave its former hostname in the saved strict list.
        let mut changed = admin.clone();
        changed.public_origin = Some("https://other.example.test".into());
        changed.validate(&tls).unwrap();
        assert_eq!(changed.public_origin_host(), Some("other.example.test"));
        assert!(!changed.explicitly_allowed_panel_host("panel.example.test"));
        let mut opted_out = changed;
        opted_out.public_origin = None;
        opted_out.validate(&tls).unwrap();
        assert!(opted_out.allowed_hosts.is_empty());
        for invalid in [
            "http://panel.example.test",
            "https://*.example.test",
            "https://localhost",
            "https://127.0.0.1",
            "https://panel.example.test/a",
            "https://panel.example.test/?x=1",
            "https://admin@panel.example.test",
            "https://panel.example.test#frag",
            "https://panel.example.test:0",
            "https://panel.example.test:99999",
            "https://panel.example.test,https://evil.example.test",
        ] {
            let mut candidate = admin.clone();
            candidate.public_origin = Some(invalid.into());
            assert!(candidate.validate(&tls).is_err(), "must reject {invalid}");
        }
    }
    #[test]
    fn administration_hostname_count_is_not_artificially_capped() {
        let mut admin = Administration {
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
 // Test the real admin settings normalization helpers and visible form wiring;
 // source-level UI test only, not a Rust or browser integration test.
 import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
 import fs from 'node:fs';
 import vm from 'node:vm';
 const js = fs.readFileSync('src/admin/web/settings.js','utf8');
 const html = fs.readFileSync('src/admin/web/index.html','utf8');
 const en = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync('langs/en_US.json','utf8'));
 const pl = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync('langs/pl_pl.json','utf8'));
 const api = JSON.parse(fs.readFileSync('src/admin/openapi.json','utf8'));
 const begin = js.indexOf('  function pinnedAdminHostname(value) {');
 const end = js.indexOf('  const normalizedRequestedTab', begin);
 assert(begin >= 0 && end > begin, 'real admin form normalization helpers must exist');
 const sandbox = vm.createContext({URL});
 vm.runInContext(js.slice(begin,end),sandbox);
 const normalize = (hosts, pin) => Array.from(vm.runInContext(
  `additionalAdminHosts(${JSON.stringify(hosts)},${JSON.stringify(pin)})`,sandbox));
 const cases = [
  {name:'empty form',hosts:[],pin:null,expected:[]},
  {name:'simple single origin',hosts:[],pin:'https://panel.example.test',expected:[]},
  {name:'0.31.4 repeated host',hosts:['panel.example.test'],pin:'https://panel.example.test',expected:[]},
  {name:'case and trailing dot',hosts:['PANEL.Example.Test.',' other.example.test '],pin:'https://panel.example.test:8443',expected:['other.example.test']},
  {name:'multiple additional names',hosts:['foo.example.test','panel.example.test','bar.example.test'],pin:'https://panel.example.test',expected:['foo.example.test','bar.example.test']},
  {name:'pin changed',hosts:['other.example.test'],pin:'https://new.example.test',expected:['other.example.test']},
  {name:'no pin means independent allowlist',hosts:['panel.example.test'],pin:'',expected:['panel.example.test']},
  {name:'invalid URL delegates to server validation',hosts:['other.example.test'],pin:'not a url',expected:['other.example.test']},
  {name:'blank host lines removed',hosts:['',' panel.example.test  ','  '],pin:null,expected:['panel.example.test']},
 ];
 for (const item of cases) {
  assert.deepEqual(normalize(item.hosts,item.pin),item.expected,item.name);
 }
 const admin = html.split('id="settings-page-administration"')[1].split('id="settings-page-system-info"')[0];
 for (const id of ['admin-public-origin','admin-extra-hosts-details','admin-hosts'])
  assert(admin.includes(`id="${id}"`),`missing ${id}`);
 assert(admin.indexOf('id="admin-public-origin"') < admin.indexOf('id="admin-extra-hosts-details"'));
 assert(admin.includes('<details id="admin-extra-hosts-details">'));
 assert(js.includes('$("admin-extra-hosts-details").open = extraHosts.length > 0'));
 assert(js.includes('additionalAdminHosts(admin.allowed_hosts || [], admin.public_origin)'));
 assert(js.includes('allowed_hosts: additionalAdminHosts($("admin-hosts").value.split('));
 assert(!js.includes('allowed_hosts: $("admin-hosts").value.split('));
 for (const key of ['administrationHosts','administrationHostsAdvanced','administrationHostsHelp','administrationPublicOriginHelp']) {
  assert.equal(typeof en.translations[key],'string'); assert.equal(typeof pl.translations[key],'string');
  assert(en.translations[key].length > 15 && pl.translations[key].length > 15,key);
 }
 // Config contract remains compatible; the pin allows a host implicitly.
 const spec = api.components?.schemas || api.definitions;
 const specText=JSON.stringify(spec);
 assert(specText.includes('implicitly allowed'));
 assert(specText.includes('automatically allowed'));
 console.log(`PASS: ${cases.length} real settings-helper scenarios, HTML/wiring, locale parity and OpenAPI descriptions`);
@@ -0,0 +1,210 @@
 // Reconstruct ONLY the RustProxy 0.31.4 administration Origin guard decision.
 // Real-source anchors guard against accidental model/source drift. This is NOT
 // a Rust server, not a browser, and not an HTTP/2 or TLS integration test.
 import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
 import fs from 'node:fs';
 import http from 'node:http';
 import {fileURLToPath} from 'node:url';
 import path from 'node:path';
 const root = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), '../..');
 const read = p => fs.readFileSync(path.join(root, p), 'utf8');
 const source = {
  settings: read('src/settings.rs') + read('src/settings/public_origin.rs'), access: read('src/admin/access.rs'),
  session: read('src/admin/session.rs'), forwarding: read('src/forwarding.rs'),
 };
 for (const [part, tokens] of Object.entries({
  settings: ['pub public_origin: Option<String>', 'fn normalize_public_admin_origin(public_origin: &str)', 'fn include_public_origin_host(&mut self)', 'fn explicitly_allowed_panel_host(&self, host: &str)', 'self.public_origin != active.public_origin'],
  access: ['fn configured_admin_public_authority(', 'fn pinned_admin_proto_compatible(', 'hops > 8', 'scheme != "https"', 'trusted_admin_proxy(state, peer)'],
  session: ['configured_admin_public_authority(&state, headers, peer, &raw_host, transport)', 'automation_credentials', 'pinned_origin_mismatch', '"origin_mismatch"', '"cross_site_fetch"'],
  forwarding: ['self.trust_proto && self.trusted(ip)'],
 })) for (const token of tokens) assert(source[part].includes(token), `Source contract missing: ${part}/${token}`);
 const defaults = {host:'127.0.0.1:9090', 'x-forwarded-host':'panel.example.test',
  'x-forwarded-proto':'https', 'sec-fetch-site':'same-origin'};
 const context = {listenIp:'127.0.0.1', listenPort:9090, tls:false,
  peerTrusted:true, trustProto:true, publicOrigin:null, allowedHosts:['panel.example.test'],
  automation:false};
 const normal = x => x.toLowerCase();
 function authority(value) {
  if (typeof value !== 'string' || !value || value.includes('@') || value.includes(',') || value.includes('/')) return null;
  try {
    const parsed = new URL(`https://${value}/`);
    if (parsed.username || parsed.password || parsed.hash || parsed.search || parsed.pathname !== '/') return null;
    const host = parsed.hostname.toLowerCase();
    return {host, port:parsed.port ? Number(parsed.port) : null};
  } catch {return null;}
 }
 function sameAuthority(a,b,scheme) {
  const left=authority(a), right=authority(b);
  if (!left || !right) return false;
  const defaultPort = scheme === 'https' ? 443 : 80;
  return left.host===right.host && (left.port ?? defaultPort)===(right.port ?? defaultPort);
 }
 function hostAllowed(value, tls, cfg) {
  const actual=authority(value);
  if (!actual) return false;
  const port=actual.port ?? (tls ? 443 : 80);
  // Effective runtime/desired allowlist also includes the public origin host;
  // only extra names are persisted in allowed_hosts.
  const pinnedHost=cfg.publicOrigin ? new URL(cfg.publicOrigin).hostname.toLowerCase() : null;
  return (actual.host===cfg.listenIp && port===cfg.listenPort)
      || cfg.allowedHosts.includes(actual.host)
      || actual.host===pinnedHost;
 }
 const map = raw => {
  const headers=new Map();
  for (let i=0;i<raw.length;i+=2) {
    const name=normal(raw[i]);
    headers.set(name,[...(headers.get(name)||[]),raw[i+1]]);
  }
  return headers;
 };
 const all = (headers,name) => headers.get(name)||[];
 const single = (headers,name) => all(headers,name).length===1 ? all(headers,name)[0] : null;
 function protoCompatible(headers) {
  let hops=0;
  for (const value of all(headers,'x-forwarded-proto')) {
    for (const part of value.split(',')) {
      hops++;
      const scheme=part.trim();
      if (hops>8 || (hops===1 && scheme!=='https') || !['http','https'].includes(scheme)) return false;
    }
  }
  return true;
 }
 function originMatches(value,scheme,external) {
  if (typeof value!=='string' || value.includes('#') || value.includes('@')) return false;
  try {
    const uri=new URL(value);
    if (uri.protocol!==`${scheme}:` || uri.pathname!=='/' || uri.search || uri.hash || uri.username || uri.password) return false;
    return sameAuthority(uri.host, external, scheme);
  } catch {return false;}
 }
 function guard(headers,cfg) {
  const rawHost=single(headers,'host');
  if (!rawHost) return {status:403,reason:'invalid_host'};
  let scheme=cfg.tls ? 'https' : 'http', external=rawHost;
  // 0.31.4 public pin only behind a trusted last hop and only for panel traffic.
  if (cfg.publicOrigin && cfg.peerTrusted && !cfg.automation) {
    let pinned;
    try { pinned=new URL(cfg.publicOrigin); } catch {return {status:403,reason:'pinned_origin_mismatch'};}
    if (pinned.protocol!=='https:' || !hostAllowed(rawHost,cfg.tls,cfg) || !protoCompatible(headers))
      return {status:403,reason:'pinned_origin_mismatch'};
    const xfh=all(headers,'x-forwarded-host');
    if (xfh.length>1 || xfh.length===1 && !sameAuthority(xfh[0],pinned.host,'https'))
      return {status:403,reason:'pinned_origin_mismatch'};
    scheme='https'; external=pinned.host;
  } else {
    if (!cfg.tls && cfg.peerTrusted && cfg.trustProto && all(headers,'x-forwarded-proto').length) {
      const proto=single(headers,'x-forwarded-proto');
      if (proto!=='https' && proto!=='http') return {status:403,reason:'external_scheme'};
      scheme=proto;
    }
    if (cfg.peerTrusted && all(headers,'x-forwarded-host').length)
      external=single(headers,'x-forwarded-host');
    if (!hostAllowed(external,scheme==='https',cfg))
      return {status:403,reason:'invalid_host'};
  }
  const originValues=all(headers,'origin');
  if (originValues.length>1 || originValues.length===1 && !originMatches(originValues[0],scheme,external))
    return {status:403,reason:'origin_mismatch'};
  if (all(headers,'sec-fetch-site').includes('cross-site'))
    return {status:403,reason:'cross_site_fetch'};
  return {status:200,reason:'pass',scheme};
 }
 const cases=[];
 const add=(name,patch,opts,expected)=>cases.push({name,patch,opts,expected});
 const PIN={publicOrigin:'https://panel.example.test',allowedHosts:[]};
 add('legacy normal same-origin GET', {},{},'pass');
 add('no pin and no DNS allowlist rejects proxied host', {},{allowedHosts:[]},'invalid_host');
 add('legacy malformed multi-hop chain', {'x-forwarded-proto':'https, http'},{},'external_scheme');
 add('legacy duplicated XFP lines', {'x-forwarded-proto':['https','http']},{},'external_scheme');
 add('legacy explicit DNS host without pin', {'host':'other.example.test','x-forwarded-host':'other.example.test'},
  {allowedHosts:['other.example.test']}, 'pass');
 add('legacy extra host without pin still denies unknown', {'host':'evil.example.test','x-forwarded-host':'evil.example.test'},
  {allowedHosts:['other.example.test']}, 'invalid_host');
 add('pin: normal GET, persisted allowed_hosts empty', {},PIN,'pass');
 add('pin: public Host implicitly allowed', {'host':'panel.example.test'},PIN,'pass');
 add('pin: unknown Host still rejected', {'host':'unknown.example.test'},PIN,'pinned_origin_mismatch');
 add('pin: old 0.31.4 explicit hostname remains compatible', {}, {...PIN,allowedHosts:['panel.example.test']},'pass');
 add('pin: additional DNS host accepted only with matching forwarded public Host',
  {'host':'other.example.test'}, {...PIN,allowedHosts:['other.example.test']},'pass');
 add('pin: changing public origin does not allow previous hostname',
  {'host':'panel.example.test','x-forwarded-host':'new.example.test'},
  {...PIN,publicOrigin:'https://new.example.test'},'pinned_origin_mismatch');
 add('pin: GET multi-hop https then http',{'x-forwarded-proto':'https, http'},PIN,'pass');
 add('pin: duplicate XFP lines',{'x-forwarded-proto':['https','http']},PIN,'pass');
 add('pin: 8-hop bounded chain',{'x-forwarded-proto':'https, http, http, http, http, http, http, http'},PIN,'pass');
 add('pin: 9-hop rejected',{'x-forwarded-proto':'https, http, http, http, http, http, http, http, http'},PIN,'pinned_origin_mismatch');
 add('pin: no XFP; public origin configured',{'x-forwarded-proto':null},PIN,'pass');
 add('pin: no XFH; internal Host still validated',{'x-forwarded-host':null,'origin':'https://panel.example.test'},PIN,'pass');
 add('pin: wrong XFH',{'x-forwarded-host':'attacker.example.test'},PIN,'pinned_origin_mismatch');
 add('pin: different allowed Host but wrong configured URL',{'x-forwarded-host':'panel.example.test:8443'},PIN,'pinned_origin_mismatch');
 add('pin: XFH userinfo rejected',{'x-forwarded-host':'attacker@panel.example.test'},PIN,'pinned_origin_mismatch');
 add('pin: duplicate XFH lines',{'x-forwarded-host':['panel.example.test','panel.example.test']},PIN,'pinned_origin_mismatch');
 add('pin: first hop downgraded HTTP',{'x-forwarded-proto':'http, https'},PIN,'pinned_origin_mismatch');
 add('pin: HTTP only',{'x-forwarded-proto':'http'},PIN,'pinned_origin_mismatch');
 add('pin: unrecognized protocol',{'x-forwarded-proto':'ftp, http'},PIN,'pinned_origin_mismatch');
 add('pin: empty protocol element',{'x-forwarded-proto':'https, '},PIN,'pinned_origin_mismatch');
 add('pin: invalid XFP capitalization',{'x-forwarded-proto':'HTTPS'},PIN,'pinned_origin_mismatch');
 add('pin: correct explicit browser Origin',{'origin':'https://panel.example.test','x-forwarded-proto':'https, http'},PIN,'pass');
 add('pin: correct explicit Origin with :443',{'origin':'https://panel.example.test:443'},PIN,'pass');
 add('pin: attacker Origin rejected',{'origin':'https://attacker.example.test'},PIN,'origin_mismatch');
 add('pin: Origin null rejected',{'origin':'null'},PIN,'origin_mismatch');
 add('pin: conflicting Origin port rejected',{'origin':'https://panel.example.test:8443'},PIN,'origin_mismatch');
 add('pin: cross-site API request rejected',{'sec-fetch-site':'cross-site'},PIN,'cross_site_fetch');
 add('pin: untrusted peer must not apply pin',{'x-forwarded-proto':'https, http','origin':'https://panel.example.test'}, {...PIN,peerTrusted:false},'origin_mismatch');
 add('pin: credential automation remains strict',{'x-forwarded-proto':'https, http'}, {...PIN,automation:true},'external_scheme');
 add('pin: Host cannot spoof unallowlisted identity',{'host':'attacker.example.test'},PIN,'pinned_origin_mismatch');
 add('pin: correct alt port 8443',{'x-forwarded-host':'panel.example.test:8443','origin':'https://panel.example.test:8443'}, {...PIN, publicOrigin:'https://panel.example.test:8443'},'pass');
 function encodedHeaders(patch) {
  const merged={...defaults,...patch};
  const result={};
  for (const [key,value] of Object.entries(merged)) if (value!==null) result[key]=value;
  return result;
 }
 const pending=[];
 const server=http.createServer((req,res)=>{
  const item=pending.shift();
  if (!item) return res.writeHead(500).end('no scenario');
  const result=guard(map(req.rawHeaders),{...context,...item.opts});
  res.writeHead(result.status, {'content-type':'application/json'}).end(JSON.stringify(result));
 });
 await new Promise(resolve=>server.listen(0,'127.0.0.1',resolve));
 async function request(item) {
  pending.push(item);
  return await new Promise((resolve,reject)=>{
    const req=http.request({hostname:'127.0.0.1',port:server.address().port,path:'/api/auth/session',
      agent:false,headers:encodedHeaders(item.patch)},res=>{
      let data='';res.setEncoding('utf8');res.on('data',part=>data+=part);
      res.on('end',()=>resolve(JSON.parse(data)));
    });
    req.on('error',reject);req.end();
  });
 }
 try {
  for (const item of cases) {
    const result=await request(item);
    assert.equal(result.reason,item.expected,item.name);
    assert.equal(result.status,item.expected==='pass' ? 200:403,item.name);
  }
  const repeats=[];
  for (const configured of [false,true]) {
    for (let attempt=1;attempt<=12;attempt++) {
      const malformed=attempt%4===0;
      const result=await request({patch:{'x-forwarded-proto':malformed?'https, http':'https'},
        opts:configured? PIN : {}});
      assert.equal(result.status,configured?200:(malformed?403:200));
      repeats.push({pin:configured,attempt,forwardedProto:malformed?'https, http':'https',status:result.status,reason:result.reason});
    }
  }
  const summary={cases:cases.length,repeated:repeats.length,unconfigured403:repeats.filter(x=>!x.pin&&x.status===403).length,
    pinned403:repeats.filter(x=>x.pin&&x.status===403).length};
  const output={release:'0.31.4',classification:'Node.js HTTP simulation of admin guard, not compiled RustProxy',
    assertions:cases.length+repeats.length,scenarios:cases.map(({name,expected})=>({name,expected})),repeats,summary};
  if (process.argv[2]) fs.writeFileSync(process.argv[2],JSON.stringify(output,null,2)+'\n');
  console.log(`PASS: ${output.assertions} HTTP-simulation assertions: ${summary.cases} cases + ${summary.repeated} resumes; `+
    `403 with no pin ${summary.unconfigured403}/12, 403 with pin ${summary.pinned403}/12`);
 } finally {server.close();}
@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
 // Reconstruct ONLY the RustProxy 0.31.4 administration Origin guard decision.
 // Real-source anchors guard against accidental model/source drift. This is NOT
 // a Rust server, not a browser, and not an HTTP/2 or TLS integration test.
 import assert from 'node:assert/strict';
 import fs from 'node:fs';
 import http from 'node:http';
 import {fileURLToPath} from 'node:url';
 import path from 'node:path';
 const root = path.resolve(path.dirname(fileURLToPath(import.meta.url)), '../..');
 const read = p => fs.readFileSync(path.join(root, p), 'utf8');
 const source = {
  settings: read('src/settings.rs') + read('src/settings/public_origin.rs'), access: read('src/admin/access.rs'),
  session: read('src/admin/session.rs'), forwarding: read('src/forwarding.rs'),
 };
 for (const [part, tokens] of Object.entries({
  settings: ['pub public_origin: Option<String>', 'fn include_public_origin_host(&mut self)', 'self.public_origin != active.public_origin'],
  access: ['fn configured_admin_public_authority(', 'fn pinned_admin_proto_compatible(', 'hops > 8', 'scheme != "https"', 'trusted_admin_proxy(state, peer)'],
  session: ['configured_admin_public_authority(&state, headers, peer, &raw_host, transport)', 'automation_credentials', 'pinned_origin_mismatch', '"origin_mismatch"', '"cross_site_fetch"'],
  forwarding: ['self.trust_proto && self.trusted(ip)'],
 })) for (const token of tokens) assert(source[part].includes(token), `Source contract missing: ${part}/${token}`);
 const defaults = {host:'127.0.0.1:9090', 'x-forwarded-host':'panel.example.test',
  'x-forwarded-proto':'https', 'sec-fetch-site':'same-origin'};
 const context = {listenIp:'127.0.0.1', listenPort:9090, tls:false,
  peerTrusted:true, trustProto:true, publicOrigin:null, allowedHosts:['panel.example.test'],
  automation:false};
 const normal = x => x.toLowerCase();
 function authority(value) {
  if (typeof value !== 'string' || !value || value.includes('@') || value.includes(',') || value.includes('/')) return null;
  try {
    const parsed = new URL(`https://${value}/`);
    if (parsed.username || parsed.password || parsed.hash || parsed.search || parsed.pathname !== '/') return null;
    const host = parsed.hostname.toLowerCase();
    return {host, port:parsed.port ? Number(parsed.port) : null};
  } catch {return null;}
 }
 function sameAuthority(a,b,scheme) {
  const left=authority(a), right=authority(b);
  if (!left || !right) return false;
  const defaultPort = scheme === 'https' ? 443 : 80;
  return left.host===right.host && (left.port ?? defaultPort)===(right.port ?? defaultPort);
 }
 function hostAllowed(value, tls, cfg) {
  const actual=authority(value);
  if (!actual) return false;
  const port=actual.port ?? (tls ? 443 : 80);
  const pinnedHost=cfg.publicOrigin ? new URL(cfg.publicOrigin).hostname.toLowerCase() : null;
  // The validated public panel hostname is derived at runtime.
  return (actual.host===cfg.listenIp && port===cfg.listenPort)
      || cfg.allowedHosts.includes(actual.host)
      || actual.host===pinnedHost;
 }
 const map = raw => {
  const headers=new Map();
  for (let i=0;i<raw.length;i+=2) {
    const name=normal(raw[i]);
    headers.set(name,[...(headers.get(name)||[]),raw[i+1]]);
  }
  return headers;
 };
 const all = (headers,name) => headers.get(name)||[];
 const single = (headers,name) => all(headers,name).length===1 ? all(headers,name)[0] : null;
 function protoCompatible(headers) {
  let hops=0;
  for (const value of all(headers,'x-forwarded-proto')) {
    for (const part of value.split(',')) {
      hops++;
      const scheme=part.trim();
      if (hops>8 || (hops===1 && scheme!=='https') || !['http','https'].includes(scheme)) return false;
    }
  }
  return true;
 }
 function originMatches(value,scheme,external) {
  if (typeof value!=='string' || value.includes('#') || value.includes('@')) return false;
  try {
    const uri=new URL(value);
    if (uri.protocol!==`${scheme}:` || uri.pathname!=='/' || uri.search || uri.hash || uri.username || uri.password) return false;
    return sameAuthority(uri.host, external, scheme);
  } catch {return false;}
 }
 function guard(headers,cfg) {
  const rawHost=single(headers,'host');
  if (!rawHost) return {status:403,reason:'invalid_host'};
  let scheme=cfg.tls ? 'https' : 'http', external=rawHost;
  // 0.31.4 public pin only behind a trusted last hop and only for panel traffic.
  if (cfg.publicOrigin && cfg.peerTrusted && !cfg.automation) {
    let pinned;
    try { pinned=new URL(cfg.publicOrigin); } catch {return {status:403,reason:'pinned_origin_mismatch'};}
    if (pinned.protocol!=='https:' || !hostAllowed(rawHost,cfg.tls,cfg) || !protoCompatible(headers))
      return {status:403,reason:'pinned_origin_mismatch'};
    const xfh=all(headers,'x-forwarded-host');
    if (xfh.length>1 || xfh.length===1 && !sameAuthority(xfh[0],pinned.host,'https'))
      return {status:403,reason:'pinned_origin_mismatch'};
    scheme='https'; external=pinned.host;
  } else {
    if (!cfg.tls && cfg.peerTrusted && cfg.trustProto && all(headers,'x-forwarded-proto').length) {
      const proto=single(headers,'x-forwarded-proto');
      if (proto!=='https' && proto!=='http') return {status:403,reason:'external_scheme'};
      scheme=proto;
    }
    if (cfg.peerTrusted && all(headers,'x-forwarded-host').length)
      external=single(headers,'x-forwarded-host');
    if (!hostAllowed(external,scheme==='https',cfg))
      return {status:403,reason:'invalid_host'};
  }
  const originValues=all(headers,'origin');
  if (originValues.length>1 || originValues.length===1 && !originMatches(originValues[0],scheme,external))
    return {status:403,reason:'origin_mismatch'};
  if (all(headers,'sec-fetch-site').includes('cross-site'))
    return {status:403,reason:'cross_site_fetch'};
  return {status:200,reason:'pass',scheme};
 }
 const cases=[];
 const add=(name,patch,opts,expected)=>cases.push({name,patch,opts,expected});
 const PIN={publicOrigin:'https://panel.example.test',allowedHosts:[]};
 add('legacy normal same-origin GET', {},{},'pass');
 add('legacy malformed multi-hop chain', {'x-forwarded-proto':'https, http'},{},'external_scheme');
 add('legacy duplicated XFP lines', {'x-forwarded-proto':['https','http']},{},'external_scheme');
 add('pin: normal GET', {},PIN,'pass');
 add('pin: GET multi-hop https then http',{'x-forwarded-proto':'https, http'},PIN,'pass');
 add('pin: duplicate XFP lines',{'x-forwarded-proto':['https','http']},PIN,'pass');
 add('pin: 8-hop bounded chain',{'x-forwarded-proto':'https, http, http, http, http, http, http, http'},PIN,'pass');
 add('pin: 9-hop rejected',{'x-forwarded-proto':'https, http, http, http, http, http, http, http, http'},PIN,'pinned_origin_mismatch');
 add('pin: no XFP; public origin configured',{'x-forwarded-proto':null},PIN,'pass');
 add('pin: no XFH; internal Host still validated',{'x-forwarded-host':null,'origin':'https://panel.example.test'},PIN,'pass');
 add('pin: wrong XFH',{'x-forwarded-host':'attacker.example.test'},PIN,'pinned_origin_mismatch');
 add('pin: different allowed Host but wrong configured URL',{'x-forwarded-host':'panel.example.test:8443'},PIN,'pinned_origin_mismatch');
 add('pin: XFH userinfo rejected',{'x-forwarded-host':'attacker@panel.example.test'},PIN,'pinned_origin_mismatch');
 add('pin: duplicate XFH lines',{'x-forwarded-host':['panel.example.test','panel.example.test']},PIN,'pinned_origin_mismatch');
 add('pin: first hop downgraded HTTP',{'x-forwarded-proto':'http, https'},PIN,'pinned_origin_mismatch');
 add('pin: HTTP only',{'x-forwarded-proto':'http'},PIN,'pinned_origin_mismatch');
 add('pin: unrecognized protocol',{'x-forwarded-proto':'ftp, http'},PIN,'pinned_origin_mismatch');
 add('pin: empty protocol element',{'x-forwarded-proto':'https, '},PIN,'pinned_origin_mismatch');
 add('pin: invalid XFP capitalization',{'x-forwarded-proto':'HTTPS'},PIN,'pinned_origin_mismatch');
 add('pin: correct explicit browser Origin',{'origin':'https://panel.example.test','x-forwarded-proto':'https, http'},PIN,'pass');
 add('pin: correct explicit Origin with :443',{'origin':'https://panel.example.test:443'},PIN,'pass');
 add('pin: attacker Origin rejected',{'origin':'https://attacker.example.test'},PIN,'origin_mismatch');
 add('pin: Origin null rejected',{'origin':'null'},PIN,'origin_mismatch');
 add('pin: conflicting Origin port rejected',{'origin':'https://panel.example.test:8443'},PIN,'origin_mismatch');
 add('pin: cross-site API request rejected',{'sec-fetch-site':'cross-site'},PIN,'cross_site_fetch');
 add('pin: untrusted peer must not apply pin',{'x-forwarded-proto':'https, http','origin':'https://panel.example.test'}, {...PIN,peerTrusted:false},'origin_mismatch');
 add('pin: credential automation remains strict',{'x-forwarded-proto':'https, http'}, {...PIN,automation:true},'external_scheme');
 add('pin: Host cannot spoof unallowlisted identity',{'host':'attacker.example.test'},PIN,'pinned_origin_mismatch');
 add('pin: correct alt port 8443',{'x-forwarded-host':'panel.example.test:8443','origin':'https://panel.example.test:8443'}, {...PIN, publicOrigin:'https://panel.example.test:8443'},'pass');
 function encodedHeaders(patch) {
  const merged={...defaults,...patch};
  const result={};
  for (const [key,value] of Object.entries(merged)) if (value!==null) result[key]=value;
  return result;
 }
 const pending=[];
 const server=http.createServer((req,res)=>{
  const item=pending.shift();
  if (!item) return res.writeHead(500).end('no scenario');
  const result=guard(map(req.rawHeaders),{...context,...item.opts});
  res.writeHead(result.status, {'content-type':'application/json'}).end(JSON.stringify(result));
 });
 await new Promise(resolve=>server.listen(0,'127.0.0.1',resolve));
 async function request(item) {
  pending.push(item);
  return await new Promise((resolve,reject)=>{
    const req=http.request({hostname:'127.0.0.1',port:server.address().port,path:'/api/auth/session',
      agent:false,headers:encodedHeaders(item.patch)},res=>{
      let data='';res.setEncoding('utf8');res.on('data',part=>data+=part);
      res.on('end',()=>resolve(JSON.parse(data)));
    });
    req.on('error',reject);req.end();
  });
 }
 try {
  for (const item of cases) {
    const result=await request(item);
    assert.equal(result.reason,item.expected,item.name);
    assert.equal(result.status,item.expected==='pass' ? 200:403,item.name);
  }
  const repeats=[];
  for (const configured of [false,true]) {
    for (let attempt=1;attempt<=12;attempt++) {
      const malformed=attempt%4===0;
      const result=await request({patch:{'x-forwarded-proto':malformed?'https, http':'https'},
        opts:configured? PIN : {}});
      assert.equal(result.status,configured?200:(malformed?403:200));
      repeats.push({pin:configured,attempt,forwardedProto:malformed?'https, http':'https',status:result.status,reason:result.reason});
    }
  }
  const summary={cases:cases.length,repeated:repeats.length,unconfigured403:repeats.filter(x=>!x.pin&&x.status===403).length,
    pinned403:repeats.filter(x=>x.pin&&x.status===403).length};
  const output={release:'0.31.4',classification:'Node.js HTTP simulation of admin guard, not compiled RustProxy',
    assertions:cases.length+repeats.length,scenarios:cases.map(({name,expected})=>({name,expected})),repeats,summary};
  if (process.argv[2]) fs.writeFileSync(process.argv[2],JSON.stringify(output,null,2)+'\n');
  console.log(`PASS: ${output.assertions} HTTP-simulation assertions: ${summary.cases} cases + ${summary.repeated} resumes; `+
    `403 with no pin ${summary.unconfigured403}/12, 403 with pin ${summary.pinned403}/12`);
 } finally {server.close();}
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ def read_docker_agent_source() -> str:
 preflight(root)
 manifest = tomllib.loads((root / "Cargo.toml").read_text())
-assert manifest["package"]["version"] == "0.31.3"
+assert manifest["package"]["version"] == "0.31.4"
 assert manifest["dependencies"]["quinn"]["version"] == "0.11.12"
 h3dep = manifest["dependencies"]["h3"]
 assert h3dep["package"] == "hpx-h3" and h3dep["version"] == "=2.5.20" and "quinn" in h3dep["features"]
@@ -32,14 +32,14 @@ assert "h3-quinn" not in manifest["dependencies"]
 lock_path = root / "Cargo.lock"
 if lock_path.exists():
    lock = lock_path.read_text()
-    assert 'name = "rust-proxy"\nversion = "0.31.3"' in lock
+    assert 'name = "rust-proxy"\nversion = "0.31.4"' in lock
    assert 'name = "systemstat"' in lock and 'name = "metrics-process"' in lock and 'name = "sysinfo"' in lock, "Cargo.lock must be resolver-generated after adding cross-platform statistics libraries"
 for release_doc, marker in {
-    "README.md": "# RustProxy 0.31.3",
+    "README.md": "# RustProxy 0.31.4",
-    "CHANGELOG.md": "## 0.31.3",
+    "CHANGELOG.md": "## 0.31.4",
-    "ROADMAP.md": "## 0.31.3",
+    "ROADMAP.md": "## 0.31.4",
-    "AGENTS.md": "Current source version: 0.31.3.",
+    "AGENTS.md": "Current source version: 0.31.4.",
-    "docs/TEST_REPORT.md": "# Verification report - RustProxy 0.31.3",
+    "docs/TEST_REPORT.md": "# Verification report - RustProxy 0.31.4",
 }.items():
    assert marker in (root / release_doc).read_text(), f"stale release identity in {release_doc}"
 assert tomllib.loads((root / "rust-toolchain.toml").read_text())["toolchain"]["channel"] == "stable"
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ assert 'Opt-in health decisions based on ordinary user traffic. Defaults to disa
 assert '"force_ssl"' in openapi and '"forward_client_ip"' in openapi
 assert '"backend_header"' in openapi and '"backend_timing_header"' in openapi
 assert '"StreamMetrics"' in openapi and '"streams"' in openapi
-for marker in ['"version": "0.31.3"', '"/api/traffic"', '"capture_user_agent"', '"capture_country"', '"hot_auto_trim_enabled"', '"hot_auto_trim_after_seconds"', '"hot_auto_trim_target_percent"', '"/api/config/{section}"', '"ConfigSectionUpdate"', '"cold_on_idle"', '"cold_on_age"', '"cold_max_hot_seconds"', '"cold_on_lru"', '"cold_on_shutdown"', '"cold_gc_interval_seconds"', '"cold_gc_max_delete"', '"collapse_enabled"', '"collapse_wait_timeout_ms"', '"collapse_timeout_fallback"', '"stale_if_error_timeout"', '"stale_if_error_connection"', '"stale_if_error_dns"', '"stale_if_error_tls"', '"stale_if_error_statuses"', '"proactive_refresh_enabled"', '"proactive_refresh_before_expiry_seconds"', '"proactive_refresh_percent"', '"proactive_refresh_max_inflight"', '"TransformSettings"', '"TransformOverrides"', '"/api/cache/cold/cleanup"', '"/api/cache/invalidate"', '"/api/cache/bans"', '"/api/cache/bans/{id}"', '"CacheInvalidationRequest"', '"CacheInvalidationResponse"', '"ColdCleanupJob"', '"match_type"', '"regex_insensitive"', '"rewrite"', '"response"', '"covered_hosts"', '"default": true']:
+for marker in ['"version": "0.31.4"', '"/api/traffic"', '"capture_user_agent"', '"capture_country"', '"hot_auto_trim_enabled"', '"hot_auto_trim_after_seconds"', '"hot_auto_trim_target_percent"', '"/api/config/{section}"', '"ConfigSectionUpdate"', '"cold_on_idle"', '"cold_on_age"', '"cold_max_hot_seconds"', '"cold_on_lru"', '"cold_on_shutdown"', '"cold_gc_interval_seconds"', '"cold_gc_max_delete"', '"collapse_enabled"', '"collapse_wait_timeout_ms"', '"collapse_timeout_fallback"', '"stale_if_error_timeout"', '"stale_if_error_connection"', '"stale_if_error_dns"', '"stale_if_error_tls"', '"stale_if_error_statuses"', '"proactive_refresh_enabled"', '"proactive_refresh_before_expiry_seconds"', '"proactive_refresh_percent"', '"proactive_refresh_max_inflight"', '"TransformSettings"', '"TransformOverrides"', '"/api/cache/cold/cleanup"', '"/api/cache/invalidate"', '"/api/cache/bans"', '"/api/cache/bans/{id}"', '"CacheInvalidationRequest"', '"CacheInvalidationResponse"', '"ColdCleanupJob"', '"match_type"', '"regex_insensitive"', '"rewrite"', '"response"', '"covered_hosts"', '"default": true']:
    assert marker in openapi, marker
 for marker in ['"NotFoundHost"', '"not_found_hosts"', '"PrometheusSettings"', '"allow_trusted_network_without_token"', '"include_docker_vhosts"', '"include_streams"', '"include_logging"']:
    assert marker in openapi, marker
@@ -1394,7 +1394,7 @@ assert '"error_log" => {' not in admin_0241 and 'request("/api/config/error_log"
 assert '"error_log"' in openapi and 'logging, error_log, forwarding' not in openapi
 assert 'logging_section_persists_error_log_settings_atomically' in admin_0241 and 'error_log_is_not_a_standalone_configuration_section' in admin_0241
 assert 'location.pathname === "/logging"' in settings_js_0241
-assert '"RuntimeInformation"' in openapi and '"version": "0.31.3"' in openapi
+assert '"RuntimeInformation"' in openapi and '"version": "0.31.4"' in openapi
 # 0.24.1 compiler and hostname-cardinality regressions.
 tls_0241 = rust_source(root, "src/tls.rs")
@@ -1633,5 +1633,5 @@ for marker_0282 in [
 assert 'Zewnętrzne ścieżki plików' in (root / 'langs/pl_pl.json').read_text()
 assert 'setfacl -m u:rustproxy:--x /etc/ssl/' in (root / 'docs/V0.28.2_IMPLEMENTATION.md').read_text()
-print("PASS: 0.31.3 manifest/package, shared system-statistics/runtime metadata, Settings logging, retained H2, external-packaging/Grafana/Prometheus/404-host/custom-location/path/cache/dashboard/Nagios UI/source contracts, stopped legacy-renewal removal, session/admin/transport contracts, deterministic package source and embedded SQLite schema-v9 migrations.")
+print("PASS: 0.31.4 manifest/package, shared system-statistics/runtime metadata, Settings logging, retained H2, external-packaging/Grafana/Prometheus/404-host/custom-location/path/cache/dashboard/Nagios UI/source contracts, stopped legacy-renewal removal, session/admin/transport contracts, deterministic package source and embedded SQLite schema-v9 migrations.")
 print("NOT VERIFIED: Rust parsing, types, compilation, linking or runtime behavior. Run ./dev.sh test.")
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""Check the 0.31.3 dependency/source migration; optionally require a resolved lock.
+"""Check the 0.31.4 dependency/source migration; optionally require a resolved lock.
 This is not a substitute for rustc, cargo metadata or runtime tests.
 """
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ parser = argparse.ArgumentParser()
 parser.add_argument('--require-lock', action='store_true', help='Require the post-upgrade Cargo.lock produced by cargo update')
 args = parser.parse_args()
 manifest = tomllib.loads((ROOT / 'Cargo.toml').read_text())
-assert manifest['package']['version'] == '0.31.3'
+assert manifest['package']['version'] == '0.31.4'
 assert manifest['package']['rust-version'] == '1.99'
 deps = manifest['dependencies']
 expected_requirements = {
@@ -78,4 +78,4 @@ if missing:
    print(f'PENDING: lockfile still requires cargo update ({details})')
 else:
    print('PASS: pinned key packages found in post-upgrade lock; cargo --locked verification is still required')
-print('PASS: 0.31.3 source dependency APIs, manifest, TLS features, toolchain images and Swagger pin (static only)')
+print('PASS: 0.31.4 source dependency APIs, manifest, TLS features, toolchain images and Swagger pin (static only)')
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env python3
-"""Rust-independent documentation/Reader consistency checks for the 0.31.3 release."""
+"""Rust-independent documentation/Reader consistency checks for the 0.31.4 release."""
 from pathlib import Path
 import re
 from rust_source import rust_source
@@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ required = [
    DOCS / "V0.25.2_AUDIT.md",
    DOCS / "V0.25.1_AUDIT.md",
    DOCS / "V0.25.0_AUDIT.md",
    DOCS / "IMPLEMENTATION_0.31.4.md",
    DOCS / "IMPLEMENTATION_0.31.3.md",
    DOCS / "IMPLEMENTATION_0.31.1.md",
    DOCS / "TEST_REPORT.md",
    DOCS / "CHANGELOG_TECHNICAL_ARCHIVE.md",
@@ -65,7 +67,7 @@ assert '"/docs/content.json"' in admin
 readme = (ROOT / "README.md").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
 roadmap = (ROOT / "ROADMAP.md").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
 changelog = (ROOT / "CHANGELOG.md").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
-assert readme.startswith("# RustProxy 0.31.3")
+assert readme.startswith("# RustProxy 0.31.4")
 assert "docs/WEB_SERVER.md" in readme and "docs/README.md" in readme
 assert readme.count("## What changed in ") == 1, "README duplicates historical release notes; use CHANGELOG/archive"
 assert "## Release history" in readme and "docs/ROADMAP_HISTORY.md" in readme
@@ -77,13 +77,22 @@ const bindSettingsForm = (id, handler) => handlers.set(id, handler);
 const adminStart = administration.indexOf('bindSettingsForm("administration-form", next => {');
 const adminEnd = administration.indexOf('bindSettingsForm("tls-policy-form",', adminStart);
 assert(adminStart > 0 && adminEnd > adminStart);
-runInNewContext(administration.slice(adminStart, adminEnd), {
+// Use the shipped helper in the extracted callback environment as well.
-  $: field, bindSettingsForm, latestStatus: { administration: { listen_locked: false } },
+const hostHelperStart = administration.indexOf('  function pinnedAdminHostname(value) {');
 const hostHelperEnd = administration.indexOf('  const normalizedRequestedTab', hostHelperStart);
 assert(hostHelperStart > 0 && hostHelperEnd > hostHelperStart);
 runInNewContext(administration.slice(hostHelperStart, hostHelperEnd) + administration.slice(adminStart, adminEnd), {
  $: field, bindSettingsForm, latestStatus: { administration: { listen_locked: false } }, URL,
 });
 const adminNext = {};
 handlers.get('administration-form')(adminNext);
 assert.deepEqual(JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(adminNext.administration.panel_compression)),
  { zstd: true, br: true, gzip: true });
 field('admin-public-origin').value = 'https://panel.example.test';
 field('admin-hosts').value = 'panel.example.test\nother.example.test';
 const pinnedNext = {};
 handlers.get('administration-form')(pinnedNext);
 assert.deepEqual(JSON.parse(JSON.stringify(pinnedNext.administration.allowed_hosts)), ['other.example.test']);
 field('admin-compression-br').checked = false;
 field('admin-compression-zstd').checked = false;
 const offNext = {};
@@ -75,10 +75,10 @@ def check(root: Path, repair_known: bool = False) -> list[str]:
            raise ValueError(f"Conflicting Rust modules: {flat.relative_to(root)} and {module.relative_to(root)}")
    for path in ["src/auth/mod.rs", "src/auth/store.rs", "src/backup/snapshot.rs", "src/upstream.rs", "src/tls.rs", "src/config/internal_routing.rs", "src/proxy/websocket.rs", "src/proxy/error_fallback.rs", "src/cache/mod.rs", "src/cache/model.rs", "src/cache/lifecycle.rs", "src/cache/cold.rs", "src/cache/dashboard.rs", "src/cache/tickets.rs", "src/cache/lookup.rs", "src/cache/policy.rs", "src/cache/fill.rs", "src/cache/tests.rs", "src/settings.rs", "src/compression.rs", "src/diagnostics.rs", "src/traffic.rs", "src/system_stats/mod.rs", "src/system_stats/linux.rs", "src/vhost.rs", "src/vhost/error_fallback.rs", "src/web_server/mod.rs", "src/web_server/config.rs", "src/web_server/filesystem.rs", "src/web_server/security.rs", "src/web_server/response.rs", "src/web_server/request.rs", "src/web_server/routing.rs", "src/web_server/fastcgi.rs", "src/web_server/htaccess.rs", "src/web_server/serve.rs", "src/web_server/tests.rs", "src/balance.rs", "src/security.rs", "src/admin/web/vhosts/core.js", "src/admin/web/vhosts/health.js", "src/admin/web/vhosts/editor.js", "src/admin/web/vhosts/render.js", "src/admin/web/web-server.js", "src/admin/web/streams.js", "src/admin/web/host404.js", "src/admin/web/app/core.js", "src/admin/web/app/session-resume.js", "src/admin/web/app/preferences.js", "src/admin/web/app/config-history.js", "src/admin/web/app/runtime.js", "src/admin/web/app/settings.js", "src/admin/web/management.js", "src/admin/web/drafts.js", "src/pages.rs", "tools/dev/mock_server.py", "tools/dev/mock_auth.py", "src/forwarding.rs", "src/tinyauth.rs", "src/http3.rs", "src/stream.rs", "src/admin/web/integrations.js", "src/admin/web/traffic-panel.js", "src/prometheus.rs", "src/admin/web/settings.js", "src/admin/web/docker.js", "src/docker.rs", "docker-agent/main.go", "docker-agent/model.go", "docker-agent/docker.go", "docker-agent/network.go", "docker-agent/certificate.go", "docker-agent/server.go", "docker-agent/main_test.go", "docker-agent/rustproxy-docker-agent.service", "docker-agent/install.sh", "docs/DOCKER_DISCOVERY.md", "docs/WEB_SERVER.md", "docs/PHP_FPM.md", "docs/README.md", "docs/TODO.md", "docs/V0.25.5_AUDIT.md", "docs/V0.25.4_AUDIT.md", "docs/V0.25.3_AUDIT.md", "docs/V0.25.2_AUDIT.md", "docs/CHANGELOG_TECHNICAL_ARCHIVE.md", "docs/ROADMAP_HISTORY.md", "tools/checks/docs_check.py", "tools/checks/web_server_contracts.py", "tools/checks/rust_source.py", "tools/checks/rust_module_contracts.py", "tools/checks/source_module_contracts.py", "scripts/runtime/acme_provider.py", "src/basic_auth.rs", "scripts/deploy/deploy.py", "scripts/deploy/deploy_core.py", "scripts/deploy/deploy_runtime.py", "scripts/migration/migrate_npm.py", "scripts/migration/migrate_npm_core.py", "scripts/migration/migrate_npm_api.py", "docs/NPM_MIGRATION.md", "docs/STREAMS.md", "install.sh", "install-debian13.sh", "update.sh", "build.rs", "scripts/build/swagger_assets.py", "src/admin/documentation.rs", "src/admin/openapi.json", "langs/en_US.json", "langs/pl_pl.json", "Dockerfile", ".dockerignore", "docs/CONTAINER.md", "docs/PROMETHEUS.md", "docs/NOT_FOUND_HOSTS.md", "grafana/rustproxy-overview.json"]:
        if not (root / path).is_file():
-            raise ValueError(f"Incomplete RustProxy 0.31.3 source tree: missing {path}")
+            raise ValueError(f"Incomplete RustProxy 0.31.4 source tree: missing {path}")
    text = (root / "src/lib.rs").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
    if '#[path = "auth/mod.rs"]' not in text:
-        raise ValueError("src/lib.rs is not the 0.31.3 entry point; extract the complete package, not individual files.")
+        raise ValueError("src/lib.rs is not the 0.31.4 entry point; extract the complete package, not individual files.")
    return messages
@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@ def upgrade_smoke(tmp: Path) -> None:
    assert backup.is_dir()
    assert (backup / "src/obsolete.rs").is_file()
    assert not (target / "src/obsolete.rs").exists()
-    assert 'version = "0.31.3"' in (target / "Cargo.toml").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
+    assert 'version = "0.31.4"' in (target / "Cargo.toml").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
    assert (target / "data/keep.txt").read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "preserve\n"
    assert (target / ".env").read_text(encoding="utf-8") == "RUST_PROXY_DEMO=0\n"
    assert (target / "langs/site.json").is_file()
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ def upgrade_smoke(tmp: Path) -> None:
    assert (target / "docker-agent/certificate.go").is_file()
    assert (target / "docker-agent/server.go").is_file()
    manifest = json.loads((backup / "upgrade.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
-    assert manifest["to_version"] == "0.31.3"
+    assert manifest["to_version"] == "0.31.4"
    assert manifest["removed_obsolete_runtime_state"] is True
    assert not legacy.exists()
    assert not (backup / "legacy-data").exists()
@@ -617,7 +617,7 @@ def source_contract_smoke() -> None:
        assert marker in admin, marker
    anonymous_block = admin.split("fn anonymous_allowed", 1)[1].split("const CERTIFICATE_API_KEY_HEADER", 1)[0]
    assert '"/api/status"' not in anonymous_block
-    assert '"RuntimeInformation"' in openapi_0241 and '"version": "0.31.3"' in openapi_0241
+    assert '"RuntimeInformation"' in openapi_0241 and '"version": "0.31.4"' in openapi_0241
    assert 'id="panel-logging"' not in html
    for marker in ['id="settings-tab-logging"', 'id="settings-page-logging"', 'id="logging-form"', 'id="error-log-form"']:
        assert marker in html, marker
@@ -1108,7 +1108,7 @@ def source_contract_smoke() -> None:
    assert '.managed-update' in main and "flush_hot_to_cold_for_update" in main
    openapi = (ROOT / "src/admin/openapi.json").read_text(encoding="utf-8")
    assert '"/api/config/history/restore"' in openapi
-    for marker in ['"version": "0.31.3"', '"memory_preset"', '"cold_preset"', '"memory_budget_bytes"', '"max_inflight"', '"preset"', '"session_days"', '"session_lifetime_seconds"', '"accept_local_listener_risk"', '"backend_header"', '"backend_timing_header"', '"cold_on_age"', '"match_type"', '"regex_insensitive"', '"NotFoundHost"', '"not_found_hosts"', '"PrometheusSettings"', '"allow_trusted_network_without_token"', '"include_docker_vhosts"', '"include_streams"', '"include_logging"']:
+    for marker in ['"version": "0.31.4"', '"memory_preset"', '"cold_preset"', '"memory_budget_bytes"', '"max_inflight"', '"preset"', '"session_days"', '"session_lifetime_seconds"', '"accept_local_listener_risk"', '"backend_header"', '"backend_timing_header"', '"cold_on_age"', '"match_type"', '"regex_insensitive"', '"NotFoundHost"', '"not_found_hosts"', '"PrometheusSettings"', '"allow_trusted_network_without_token"', '"include_docker_vhosts"', '"include_streams"', '"include_logging"']:
        assert marker in openapi, marker
    assert '"software_update"' in openapi and '"update_available"' in openapi
    for marker in ['"/api/certificates/deploy"', '"CertificateDeploy"', '"CertificateDeployResult"', '"/api/certificates/reload"']:
@@ -1313,7 +1313,7 @@ def main() -> None:
    source_contract_smoke()
    container_contract_smoke()
    grafana_contract_smoke()
-    print("PASS: 0.31.3 SQLite/schema-9/upgrade, local-response 404 hosts, Prometheus/Grafana diagnostics, external Debian-packaging separation, cache/dashboard/logging/Nagios, retained admin/H3/stream/TLS contracts and reproducible source archives.")
+    print("PASS: 0.31.4 SQLite/schema-9/upgrade, local-response 404 hosts, Prometheus/Grafana diagnostics, external Debian-packaging separation, cache/dashboard/logging/Nagios, retained admin/H3/stream/TLS contracts and reproducible source archives.")
 if __name__ == "__main__":
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ const code = js.slice(js.indexOf('    const runtime = latestStatus?.runtime || {
 const elements = new Map();
 const dollar = id => { if (!elements.has(id)) elements.set(id, { textContent: '' }); return elements.get(id); };
 const status = {
-  version: '0.31.3', uptime_seconds: 4201,
+  version: '0.31.4', uptime_seconds: 4201,
  runtime: {
    platform: 'Linux', operating_system: 'Debian GNU/Linux 13', kernel_version: '6.12.0', architecture: 'x86_64',
    statistics_source: 'systemstat+sysinfo', data_directory: '/var/lib/rustproxy', database_path: '/var/lib/rustproxy/config.sqlite3',
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ const context = {
 vm.runInNewContext(code, context);
 assert.equal(dollar('runtime-operating-system').textContent, 'Debian GNU/Linux 13');
 assert.equal(dollar('runtime-kernel-version').textContent, '6.12.0');
-assert.equal(dollar('runtime-version').textContent, '0.31.3');
+assert.equal(dollar('runtime-version').textContent, '0.31.4');
 assert.equal(dollar('runtime-logical-cpus').textContent, '8');
 assert.equal(dollar('runtime-cpu-usage').textContent, '17.2%');
 assert.equal(dollar('runtime-python').textContent, 'Available · 3.13.5');
@@ -124,4 +124,4 @@ for (const key of ['python_version','pip_version','certbot_version']) {
  assert.ok(runtimeSchema.properties.certificate_runtime.properties[key]);
  assert.equal(runtimeSchema.properties.certificate_runtime.properties[key].nullable, true);
 }
-console.log('PASS: 0.31.3 legend palette, About cleanup, system tab/navigation, read-only API schema and simulated status rendering.');
+console.log('PASS: 0.31.4 legend palette, About cleanup, system tab/navigation, read-only API schema and simulated status rendering.');
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ def run_load(
    port = parsed.port or (443 if parsed.scheme == "https" else 80)
    tls = ssl._create_unverified_context() if insecure else ssl.create_default_context()
    connection_type = http.client.HTTPSConnection if parsed.scheme == "https" else http.client.HTTPConnection
-    headers = {"user-agent": "RustProxy-Memory-Stress/0.31.3", "accept": "*/*"}
+    headers = {"user-agent": "RustProxy-Memory-Stress/0.31.4", "accept": "*/*"}
    if host_header:
        headers["host"] = host_header