v0.34.15

docs/ACCESS.md

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ Global restrictions add to per-vhost and path rules. Rate-limit requests are cou
 
 Default deny plus explicit allow exceptions is usually safer for private admin applications. Apply rules to a staging client before enforcing them on a live business-critical service.
 
-In the **Vhost → Security** editor, Traffic policy groups reusable ACL profiles and the separate **inline Vhost IP/CIDR access list** together, followed by HTTP methods, request Content-Type filtering, per-IP rates, country policy, country-rate and User-Agent-rate controls. The inline list is not a second version of an assigned profile: both layers remain independently enforced; an allow in one does not cancel a deny in the other. The **Vhost → Authentication** tab is for Basic Auth and Tinyauth only. HSTS, security headers and User-Agent blocking are separate Security groups. **Custom locations → Access** separates its ACL profile, HTTP method, country and inline IP/CIDR fields. These are only layout changes; restriction scopes still combine as described above.
+In the **Vhost → Security** editor, Traffic policy groups reusable ACL profiles and the separate **inline Vhost IP/CIDR access list** together, followed by HTTP methods, request Content-Type filtering, per-IP rates, country policy, country-rate and User-Agent-rate controls. The inline list is not a second version of an assigned profile: both layers remain independently enforced; an allow in one does not cancel a deny in the other. The **Vhost → Authentication** tab selects exactly one of Basic Auth, Tinyauth, Authelia and authentik. HSTS, security headers and User-Agent blocking are separate Security groups. **Custom locations → Access** separates its ACL profile, HTTP method, country and inline IP/CIDR fields. These are only layout changes; restriction scopes still combine as described above.
 
 ## Content-Type request denylist
 
@@ -29,13 +29,42 @@ Ordinary Vhosts can reject selected MIME types under **Vhosts → Security → R
 
 Method policies allow, block or leave methods unrestricted. A denied method returns `405`, while typical ACL/country denials return `403`. Per-client rate limits can configure request count, window and burst with optional country overrides; exceeding the limit returns `429` with `Retry-After`. Limits are application controls, not a replacement for upstream DDoS protection.
 
-## Basic Auth and Tinyauth
+## Basic Auth, Tinyauth, Authelia and authentik
 
 - **Basic Auth:** protect selected Vhosts with configured credentials. Use HTTPS so credentials are not sent over plaintext.
 - **Tinyauth:** add a verification URL and an HTTPS login URL. RustProxy makes a bounded, body-free authorization request and can pass specifically allowed identity headers upstream. An origin URL automatically uses `/api/auth/nginx` (or set that path explicitly). This Nginx auth-request integration sends `X-Original-URL` and `X-Original-Method`, with a validated `X-Forwarded-For` and `X-Real-IP` for Tinyauth IP ACLs. It does **not** send `X-Forwarded-Host` or `X-Forwarded-URI` to the verifier, avoiding the `conflicting auth module headers` rejection introduced in Tinyauth 5.2.0 while keeping compatibility with earlier versions that implement the Nginx endpoint. Tinyauth has its own timeout and private-backend policy.
-- **Tinyauth error pages (0.34.14):** RustProxy renders built-in, self-contained HTML for verifier failures: `502 Tinyauth connection error` if its HTTP client cannot reach Tinyauth (DNS/TCP/TLS/transport), `504 Tinyauth timeout` if the auth deadline expires, or `502 Tinyauth verification error` for unexpected verifier status or invalid/oversized data. The page always retains the HTTP error status, `Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8`, `Cache-Control: private, no-store` and `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`. Backend URLs, protocol errors and identity data are not shown to visitors. All of these cases **deny access** to the protected origin. HTTP `401`/`403` and configured login redirects remain unchanged. These auth-specific pages take precedence over custom Vhost/general HTTP error pages so the failure remains distinguishable.
+- **Provider-neutral gateway error pages (0.34.15):** One embedded `src/admin/web/error_auth_provider.html` template renders a self-contained HTML page for **Tinyauth, Authelia, authentik, and future providers**, using only the safe provider display name and the failure category. It replaces the three vendor-specific `error_tinyauth_*.html` source files while preserving the familiar Tinyauth response titles and statuses. For example: `502 Tinyauth connection error` if its HTTP client cannot reach Tinyauth (DNS/TCP/TLS/transport), `504 Tinyauth timeout` if the auth deadline expires, or `502 Tinyauth verification error` for unexpected verifier status or invalid/oversized data. The page always retains the HTTP error status, `Content-Type: text/html; charset=utf-8`, `Cache-Control: private, no-store` and `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff`. Backend URLs, protocol errors and identity data are not shown to visitors. All of these cases **deny access** to the protected origin. HTTP `401`/`403` and configured login redirects remain unchanged. These auth-specific pages take precedence over custom Vhost/general HTTP error pages so the failure remains distinguishable. The generic failure marker also protects Basic Auth denials and provider login redirects from being replaced by Vhost pages. HTTPS-verifier transport errors are classified as connection failures, truncated/oversized/invalid verifier responses as verification failures, and verification deadlines as timeouts.
 - Point the verifier URL **directly** at the private Tinyauth service (for example `http://tinyauth:3000/api/auth/nginx`), rather than routing it through a second public proxy that might inject conflicting headers. Do not disable Tinyauth's header-spoofing protections. Confirm that Tinyauth trusts only the actual RustProxy address/network when enabling Tinyauth IP-based access controls (`TINYAUTH_AUTH_TRUSTEDPROXIES`).
-- The two authentication integrations should not be enabled simultaneously for the same Vhost. Protected responses bypass unsafe shared caching. Confirm that login redirections and WebSockets behave as expected.
+- **Authelia (0.34.15):** select **Authelia** under **Vhost → Authentication**. Enter the internal service origin (for example `http://authelia:9091`) and the public HTTPS login portal (for example `https://auth.example.com`); RustProxy calls `/api/authz/forward-auth`. It forwards trusted `X-Forwarded-*`, `X-Original-URL` and `X-Original-Method` metadata, verifies the provider result, returns provider-approved `302/303` login redirects only to the configured portal origin, and forwards configured `Remote-*` identity headers after stripping client-forged values. A `200` verifier response alone grants access. `401`/`403` deny; transport failures return 502 and timeouts 504. The Authelia `session.cookies` domains and `authelia_url` are defined in Authelia itself: protecting **unrelated registered domains** generally requires a login URL/cookie configuration within each domain, not one cookie from a single unrelated site.
+- **authentik (0.34.15):** select **authentik** and enter the private outpost origin (for example `http://authentik:9000`), not an `/if/flow` login URL. RustProxy calls `/outpost.goauthentik.io/auth/nginx`, forwards verified `X-Authentik-*` identity headers, and responds to a `401` with a same-origin login start at `/outpost.goauthentik.io/start?rd=...`. RustProxy reserves `/outpost.goauthentik.io` (and descendants) on the protected application hostname and forwards them to the configured outpost **without checking authentication again**, after ordinary global/Vhost IP/country/rate rules. No manual Custom Location is needed for that path. In authentik create a separate **Proxy Provider → Forward auth (single application)** for each protected external application URL, assign it to the serving outpost, then enable that Vhost's integration. Multiple unrelated domains can share the same authentik installation; they do **not** share a browser cookie across domains.
+- **Adding another provider:** Keep the new vendor's `Settings` and `Compiled` implementation under `src/<provider>/mod.rs` and its tests under `src/<provider>/tests.rs`. Implement the `auth_provider::Provider` trait for runtime authorization, optional `reserved_path`/`serve_reserved` hooks for same-host callbacks, and (for Nginx-compatible providers) the shared `forward_auth::Adapter`. Add an enabled-by-default-false Vhost settings field, validate mutual exclusivity in `auth_provider::Selection`, compile it into the **single** `CompiledFrontend.auth_provider` slot, and register the method in the panel. Reuse `auth_provider::deny` / `auth_provider::gateway_failure` instead of adding separate HTML templates. Existing `tinyauth`, `authelia`, and `authentik` configuration keys remain backward compatible.
+- **Per-provider security:** The verifier/outpost connection uses TLS certificate verification for HTTPS with optional additional CA, explicit private-backend opt-in and the existing safe-address/local-listener restrictions. Only allowlisted response identity fields and bounded session cookies reach applications/browsers. Inaccessible, malformed or timed-out authorization services **deny** origin access. Both Authelia and authentik are disabled by default; old Tinyauth settings are retained when inactive. Only one of the four authentication methods can be enabled for one Vhost. Protected responses bypass shared caching. Confirm both allowed/denied requests, logins, sessions, redirects and WebSockets with the actual provider before rollout.
+
+### Minimal Vhost configuration examples (inside a Vhost object)
+
+Authelia:
+
+```json
+"authelia": {
+  "enabled": true,
+  "url": "http://authelia.internal:9091",
+  "login_url": "https://auth.example.com",
+  "allow_private": true
+}
+```
+
+authentik (same URL for the outpost check and its reserved public path):
+
+```json
+"authentik": {
+  "enabled": true,
+  "url": "http://authentik.internal:9000",
+  "allow_private": true
+}
+```
+
+Set `basic_auth.enabled`, `tinyauth.enabled`, and the other provider's `enabled` to `false` for these examples. These are fragments, not whole Vhost documents. Protect the public provider portal with a separate Vhost **without** forward auth to avoid recursive redirects.
+
 
 Do not use a User-Agent blocklist as the primary access control: HTTP clients can forge their User-Agent freely.
 

docs/API.md

@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ The section name in the URL and its corresponding JSON member in a full configur
 | `logging` | `logging`, `error_log` |
 | `global-security` | `global_security`, including `user_agent_blocking` |
 
-Every GET returns a `value` object or array whose shape can be sent unchanged to the matching PUT. For the three grouped sections the `value` contains exactly the named members; for the other sections it is the serialized value of the matching configuration member. Saving does not alter unrelated sections.
+Every GET returns a `value` object or array whose shape can be sent unchanged to the matching PUT. For the three grouped sections the `value` contains exactly the named members; for the other sections it is the serialized value of the matching configuration member. Saving does not alter unrelated sections. In 0.34.15 each ordinary Vhost may also configure mutually exclusive `authelia` and `authentik` objects alongside the existing `tinyauth`/`basic_auth` settings; both new providers default to disabled. See [Access](ACCESS.md).
 
 ### Complete section-update example
 

docs/INTEGRATIONS.md

@@ -5,7 +5,9 @@ RustProxy offers built-in integrations and optional helper components. Each has
 | Integration | Purpose | Setup and limits |
 |---|---|---|
 | **Docker agent** | Discover running Docker services and publish generated Vhosts | Install separate agent on Docker host; use Bearer token and TLS certificate pin. [Guide](DOCKER_DISCOVERY.md). |
-| **Tinyauth** | Delegate authentication for selected Vhosts | Configure verifier URL/login URL, allowed headers and HTTPS. Failed verifier connections return a fail-closed local 502 page; verifier timeouts return 504. [Access](ACCESS.md). |
+| **Tinyauth** | Delegate authentication for selected Vhosts | Existing Nginx auth-request support remains unchanged, with fail-closed 502/504 errors. [Access](ACCESS.md). |
+| **Authelia** | Forward auth for selected Vhosts | Select it in Vhost Authentication, set internal service origin and trusted public HTTPS login URL, and configure the portal's per-domain cookie rules. [Access](ACCESS.md). |
+| **authentik** | Forward auth for selected Vhosts, including unrelated application domains | Configure one authentik single-application proxy provider per public application and its serving outpost; enter the outpost's internal origin. RustProxy handles the reserved outpost path automatically. [Access](ACCESS.md). |
 | **ACME / Certbot** | Issue/renew HTTPS certificates | HTTP-01 or DNS-01 via Cloudflare, OVH or RFC2136; protect credentials. [Certificates](ACME_PROVIDERS.md). |
 | **Prometheus** | Scrape operational metrics | Separate endpoint/token/CIDR rules. [Monitoring](MONITORING.md). |
 | **Grafana** | Visualize Prometheus results | Example dashboard under `grafana/README.md`. |

docs/README.md

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 # RustProxy documentation
 
-Practical guides for **RustProxy 0.34.14**. This index and the listed pages are also available in the authenticated panel at **`/docs → Reader`**. The adjacent **API** tab provides the embedded OpenAPI reference. Paths below are links to actual files in the source archive.
+Practical guides for **RustProxy 0.34.15**. This index and the listed pages are also available in the authenticated panel at **`/docs → Reader`**. The adjacent **API** tab provides the embedded OpenAPI reference. Paths below are links to actual files in the source archive.
 
 ## Getting started
 
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ Practical guides for **RustProxy 0.34.14**. This index and the listed pages are
 
 - [Vhosts and backends](VHOSTS.md) — domains, listener bindings, request Content-Type filtering, balancing, health and redirects.
 - [Custom locations](CUSTOM_LOCATIONS.md) — path routing, rewrites, local responses and error fallbacks.
-- [Access and authentication](ACCESS.md) — ACL, country/DDNS, Basic Auth, Tinyauth and rate limits.
+- [Access and authentication](ACCESS.md) — ACL, country/DDNS, Basic Auth, Tinyauth, Authelia, authentik and rate limits.
 - [Static Web Server](WEB_SERVER.md) — document roots, generated filesystem permission commands, downloads, rules, built-in error pages and file delivery.
 - [PHP-FPM](PHP_FPM.md) — PHP service profiles, security and application examples.
 - [Cache](CACHE.md) — HOT/COLD storage, privacy, TTL, RFC 9211 `Cache-Status`, origin diagnostic headers and invalidation.
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ Practical guides for **RustProxy 0.34.14**. This index and the listed pages are
 - [Experimental TLS post-quantum key exchange](TLS_POST_QUANTUM.md) — opt-in X25519MLKEM768, compatibility, rollback and validation.
 - [TCP/UDP Streams](STREAMS.md) — non-HTTP forwarding and its security boundaries.
 
-The Vhosts and Docker discovery guides include the shared adaptive request-rate chart scale introduced in 0.34.11. Version 0.34.12 preserves that adaptive range and adds a disabled-by-default X/Y scale display option under **Settings → Appearance → Charts**. Release 0.34.13 adds global HTTP security policies and UI layout improvements, groups the global User-Agent policy under `global_security`, provides consistent section-based GET/PUT APIs, and moves manual GeoIP refresh to `POST /api/config/geoip/update`. See [Dashboard](DASHBOARD.md). Release 0.34.14 keeps the Tinyauth Nginx-header compatibility patch, adds fail-closed branded Tinyauth 502/504 error pages, without changing the existing generic 502 page, error-code registry, or other standard error templates. See [Access](ACCESS.md) and [Troubleshooting](TROUBLESHOOTING.md).
+The Vhosts and Docker discovery guides include the shared adaptive request-rate chart scale introduced in 0.34.11. Version 0.34.12 preserves that adaptive range and adds a disabled-by-default X/Y scale display option under **Settings → Appearance → Charts**. Release 0.34.13 adds global HTTP security policies and UI layout improvements, groups the global User-Agent policy under `global_security`, provides consistent section-based GET/PUT APIs, and moves manual GeoIP refresh to `POST /api/config/geoip/update`. See [Dashboard](DASHBOARD.md). Release 0.34.14 keeps the Tinyauth Nginx-header compatibility patch and dedicated fail-closed 502/504 pages. Release 0.34.15 adds optional Authelia and authentik forward-auth integrations, a shared provider runtime and a single provider-neutral HTML error template. See [Access](ACCESS.md) and [Troubleshooting](TROUBLESHOOTING.md).
 
 ## Integrations and operations
 

docs/TROUBLESHOOTING.md

@@ -14,6 +14,9 @@ Start with a reproducible request, its hostname/path and the exact listener. Com
 | `502 Tinyauth connection error` | The authentication backend cannot be reached. Check Tinyauth process, DNS, verifier URL/port, network firewall, TLS/certificate, private backend allowlist and the RustProxy service journal. Do not route the verification URL back through the protected Vhost. |
 | `502 Tinyauth verification error` | Tinyauth returned an unexpected status/body or identity headers were too large. Verify `/api/auth/nginx`, proxy header injection and the installed Tinyauth version; check the server journal for details. |
 | `504 Tinyauth timeout` | The Tinyauth verification deadline was reached. Check service load/latency and `connect_timeout_seconds` / `timeout_seconds` (Vhost Authentication tab). |
+| `502 <provider> connection error` / `502 <provider> verification error` / `504 <provider> timeout` | All delegated providers use the same `error_auth_provider.html` template. The name identifies the failing provider; the status identifies network, response-validation, or timeout failure. Check the internal URL, DNS/TLS, allowlist, deadline and RustProxy journal; origin access stays denied. |
+| Authelia redirects repeatedly | Check `login_url` HTTPS origin, `session.cookies` domains/`authelia_url` mapping, real proxy forwarding headers and original application host. Unrelated registered domains require matching per-domain cookie/portal settings. |
+| authentik redirects repeatedly or `/outpost.goauthentik.io` is 404 | Check its proxy provider is **Forward auth (single application)** for the exact external application URL, assigned to the correct outpost. Use the outpost internal origin in the Vhost; RustProxy reserves this path on each protected host. Ensure the outpost can reach authentik and browser accepts HTTPS cookies. |
 | WebSocket handshake fails or disconnects | Vhost WebSockets flag, backend Upgrade support, TLS/frontend protocol path, WebSocket idle limits and auth redirect. |
 | `403` / `405` / `429` | Applicable IP/ACL/country policy, HTTP methods, rate limit, GeoIP availability, Basic/Tinyauth permissions. |
 | Cache always BYPASS or MISS | Global + Vhost enablement, cookies/login, origin `Cache-Control`, `Set-Cookie`, `Vary`, TTL, size and exclusion rules. |