v0.24.13
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@@ -62,6 +62,27 @@ ACLs support IP/CIDR and **allow-only** DNS/DDNS hostname rules, plus reusable p
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Global response headers, per-Vhost rules and Web Service-specific headers are distinct scopes. Security and proxy-protocol headers may be protected from rewriting. Compression supports eligible response encodings; availability is still constrained by global limits and the requesting client.
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### Global HTTP block / allow and security headers (0.34.13)
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Under **Settings → Rules & headers**, choose **Global block / allow** to configure rules applying to every public HTTP vhost, redirect and 404 host. Independent controls cover **country block/allow**, global **User-Agent deny patterns**, **IP/CIDR and allow-only DNS ACL**, **HTTP method allow/block**, **request Content-Type denylist** and a **shared per-client-IP rate limit**. Disabled policies are neutral. If country allow mode is selected, an unknown GeoIP country is denied; block mode permits unknown countries. Global IP and country checks are cumulative, as are global rules and more restrictive per-vhost policies. Verify the trusted client-IP and GeoIP configuration before enabling country or rate controls. The global rate limit uses the same bucket for a given client across all public vhosts. It does not affect TCP/UDP streams or the separate administration listener.
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The adjacent **Security headers** subtab applies a global response baseline: **HSTS** (HTTPS only), **nosniff**, **X-Frame-Options**, **Referrer-Policy**, **Content-Security-Policy** and **Permissions-Policy**. Explicit per-vhost security-header values take precedence; absence of a vhost value does not cancel a global header. Test HSTS and CSP against all sites before enabling. **Global custom headers** remains a distinct subtab for arbitrary request/response header rules.
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In the updated **0.34.13** API, global User-Agent blocking is nested at `config.global_security.user_agent_blocking`; it is no longer a separate root-level setting. Example (only the relevant fragment):
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```json
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{
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"global_security": {
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"user_agent_blocking": {"enabled": true, "patterns": ["bad-bot"]},
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"country_access": {"mode": "off", "countries": []}
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}
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}
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```
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`GET /api/config/global-security` returns `{revision, section, value}` where `value` is the entire `global_security` object. To update it, send `PUT /api/config/global-security` with `{ "expected_revision": <current-revision>, "value": <complete-global_security-object> }`; the User-Agent member is **required** in the section PUT. Both Global block / allow and Security headers forms save this complete object, preserving unchanged controls from the current revision. Validation and persistence are atomic. The formerly separate `PUT /api/config/user-agent-blocking` is no longer supported.
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On upgrade, older JSON, database rows, backups and revision history containing a root-level `user_agent_blocking` are migrated at validation/compilation to the nested policy. If both old and new keys are supplied with differing values, validation fails instead of choosing one. Old configurations without `global_security` retain disabled defaults for all newly added policies. See [Administration API](API.md), [Access](ACCESS.md) and [Security](SECURITY.md).
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## Cache and transforms
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Caching is opt-in. HOT holds bounded memory entries; COLD is an optional disk tier (off by default). Freshness follows eligible HTTP policy and `Vary`; private/no-store responses and protected requests are not shared. Configuration saves can selectively invalidate affected cached responses; 0.34.0 behavior needs production validation. HTTP BAN/PURGE is **disabled by default** and uses an explicit source-IP allowlist. See [Cache](CACHE.md).
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